


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SECOND SERIES—1899-1900

VOLUME V

SECTION II

ENGLISH HISTORY, LITERATURE, ARCHÆOLOGY, ETC.

1000

THE PROBABLE SITE  
OF THE  
Battle of the Plains of Abraham

By ARTHUR G. DOUGHTY

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G. DUCHARME  
245, rue Pallan  
Montréal

IV.—*The Probable Site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham.*<sup>1</sup>

With plans and illustrations.

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*"Sunt lachrymæ rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt."*

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By ARTHUR G. DOUGHTY.

(Communicated by Sir John Bourinot.)

The memory of the famous battle fought near Quebec on the 13th of September, 1759, the final issue of which gave to England a rich portion of her splendid heritage in North America, has been revived of late in the animated discussions which have taken place as to the exact site of the contest between the French and English.

A difference of opinion has existed; two parties have been formed, and each has offered proof in support of its pretensions in favour of certain ground.

The origin of the controversy may be traced to an intimation on the part of the owners of the property known as the "Race Course," that they were about to divide this land into building lots. Tradition has associated this land with the battle-field, and ground which it is believed was once bedewed with the blood of illustrious dead, is naturally regarded as sacred.

The exigencies of commerce and the demands of progress, have already robbed the city of some of that quaint artistic charm which appealed so eloquently to the student and tourist, and it was therefore quite natural that numerous voices should be raised against the desecration of such an historic spot.

Among the many glowing pages of the annals of Quebec there is not one more brilliant than that which gave to the city her monument to Wolfe and Montcalm—a monument whereon the name of friend and foe are linked together—a monument whereby the conquered shares equal glory with the conqueror. To preserve and set apart any of the

<sup>1</sup> This paper came too late to be read and discussed in the Section, but in view of the interest taken in the subject, and the judicial spirit which the author brings to its elucidation, the Editor deems it expedient to present it in full to the public as soon as possible. The illustrations and plans, collected with great care by Mr. Doughty, give to the paper a special value, and must assist the student in coming to a correct conclusion. The notes are printed on page 418 of this paper.

remaining portion of the actual battle-field in memory of such an important event in Canadian history, would be a commendable action, and indeed in this age of activity, wherein the past is apt to be forgotten, or absorbed in the present, the isolation of such a spot would be a greater tribute to the heroic dead than even a costly monument of bronze or stone.

In order that the situation may be understood by those who are unfamiliar with the city, it may be advisable to state that the Plains of Abraham derived their name from Abraham Martin, who owned a tract of land at a short distance from the walls of the city, on the border of Cote Ste. Geneviève (see plan No. 1). In the course of time the whole of the ground between the fortifications and Marchmont, bounded on the north by Cote Ste. Geneviève, and on the south by the River St. Lawrence, was generally termed the "Plains." A distinction, however, appears to have been drawn between the "Heights" and the "Plains" of Abraham, by the English officers after the conquest. General Murray, the first English Governor, refers to "the Heights of Abraham, which entirely command the ramparts of the place at a distance of 800 yards," and again, "the enemy drew their first parallel across the heights at a distance of six hundred yards." The English seem to have named the whole of the ground between the walls of the city and Claire Fontaine street, the "Heights," and the ground on the west of Claire Fontaine street was called by them "The Plains."


The site of the decisive battle is claimed by one party to be a tract of land bounded on the west by the Marchmont property, and on the east by the Martello Towers. This ground includes the race course. On the other side it is contended that the battle was confined to the limits bounded on the east by the walls of the city, and on the west by de Salaberry street. This territory does not include the race course. (See plan No. 1 and appendix).

With a desire to contribute a few facts towards the solution of this vexed question, I have made certain investigations which are now placed at the disposal of those who are interested in the subject.

At the commencement of my study I decided to base my investigations solely upon the testimony of those who were present at the siege, and, if I were able from their testimony to discover any indication of the location of the field, satisfactory to myself, I intended to seek for confirmation of the position, or for proof to the contrary, in the writings of later historians, or by any other means at my disposal. This plan I have carried out.

An explanation of the plans accompanying this paper is here given.











# BATTLE OF THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM

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VIEW OF THE ACTION OF 13TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1759.

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No. 1. Is a view of the ground forming the high plateau between the fortifications of the city of Quebec, on the east, and the landing-place of the English army on the morning of the 13th of September, 1759, on the west.

The principal indications on this plan are :—

- (a) The ridge, known as Buttes à Neveu (Claire Fontaine Street) upon which the French army was drawn up.
- (b) The slope of the hill upon which a portion of the English line was formed.
- (c) The probable position of the "House de Borgie," which the light infantry occupied early in the morning of the 13th of Sept.
- (d) The position of Montcalm's camp, beyond the River St. Charles.
- (e) The probable route taken by the English army in its "march towards the town in files."
- (f) The distance of the English camp from the walls of the city, after the battle. This being the place where the battle was fought, according to Colonel Fraser.
- (g) The distance from the "Ridge" of the front of the French army when "most of the soldiers of the first line were either killed or wounded," according to the testimony of General Malartic.
- (h) Profile of the ground between St. Louis Gate and the landing place, parallel with Grande Allée, 130 yards south. This profile was made by Mr. Louis A. Vallée, C.E., member of the Society of Civil Engineers, from a large ordnance map attributed to Major Holland. The elevations on the plan were taken from the River St. Lawrence during the years 1785-86. The profile, therefore, represents the appearance of this portion of the ground, 26 years after the battle.
- (i) The position of the "Bakehouse," in the vicinity of which about two hundred Canadians fought and "most were cut to pieces."

Plan A. Is a portion of an authentic plan of the city of Quebec in force to-day, upon which the positions of the armies have been placed as found on plan B. This plan has been prepared to assist those who are only familiar with modern Quebec, and who may not have an opportunity of consulting old plans. The positions of the armies were determined from careful measurements taken from plan B by Mr. Elzéar Charest, architect, and director of Public Works of the Province of Quebec. In the corner of the plan a reduction is given of a

plan made of the environs of Quebec, by Noel Levasseur, in 1766, seven years after the battle. This shows the Borgia property.

Plan B. Is a copy of the plan drawn by a captain in His Majesty's navy, with a view of the action gained by the English, brought from Quebec by an officer of distinction.

This plan was published by Thos. Jeffreys, geographer to the King, and was inscribed to The Right Honourable Wm. Pitt, Secretary of State.

The book to which this plan belongs, was dedicated to General Townshend, who commanded the field on the 13th of September, 1759, after Wolfe had received his fatal wound.

General Murray probably contributed to certain portions of Jeffreys' book, or allowed the editor to make use of his letters and journal, as many events are described in exactly the same words as those found in the letters and journal, especially those referring to General Murray's actions while Governor of Quebec.

Plate C. This plate is made from an old engraving, now very scarce, which was kindly lent to me by Mr. Phileas Gagnon. The engraving was executed from a drawing by Capt. Hy. Smythe, Aide-de-Camp to General Wolfe.

The perspective is not very good, but the details of the four-gun battery on the left of the landing place, are valuable. It will be observed that the line of the army is towards the left, and that the view on the right is broken by some obstruction, possibly the "rising ground" or "hill," so often referred to in the text. This plate is about one-fourth of the size of the engraving.

Plates D and E are sufficiently explained by their titles.

Several quotations are given at length in this paper from the writings of those who were present at the engagement on the 13th of September, 1759, and some of them are perhaps longer than may be considered absolutely necessary; but to those who are unfamiliar with the locality they may be serviceable.

The first authority quoted is Captain John Knox, who served under Wolfe during the campaigns in North America, and who took part in the action of the 13th of September, 1759. The journals were published in London in 1769, and were dedicated to Lieut.-General Sir Jeffery Amherst. Minute details appear to have been recorded almost daily during the years 1758, 1759, and until the close of the war in 1760.

September 12th (1759).—"A soldier of the Royal Americans despatched this day from the south shore, and one came over to us from the enemy, who told the General that he belonged to a detachment



"composed of two officers and fifty men who had been sent across the river to take a prisoner; that the French generals suspect that we are going higher up, to lay waste the country, and to destroy such ships and craft as they have got above; and that Monsieur Montcalm will not be persuaded on to quit his situation, insisting that the flower of our army are still below the town." "In consequence of this agreeable intelligence, the following orders were this day issued to the army.

## ORDERS.

"The enemy's force is now divided; great scarcity of provisions now in their camp and universal discontent among the Canadians. Our troops below are in readiness to join us; all the light artillery and tools are embarked at Point Levis, and the troops will land where the French seem least to expect it. The first body that gets on shore is to march directly to the enemy and drive them from any little post they may occupy; the officers must be careful that the succeeding bodies do not, by any mistake, fire upon those who go on before them. The battalions must form on the upper ground with expedition, and be ready to charge whatever presents itself. When the artillery and troops are landed, a corps will be left to secure the landing place, while the rest march on and endeavour to bring the French and Canadians to battle."

This portion of the Journal is quoted for the purpose of showing :

1. That General Wolfe did not expect to meet with much opposition on the ground immediately above his landing place; that is, in the vicinity of the race course, or the Marchmont property.<sup>1</sup>
2. That he was aware that Montcalm still held his position beyond the River St. Charles, the location of which is shown on plan No. 1.
3. That he expected to have to march towards Montcalm's camp to bring the enemy to battle.

It will be seen from these orders that Wolfe was in possession of valuable information as to the enemy's position, and that it was his intention to fight the battle near the city, otherwise it would have been unnecessary to have left troops on the Marchmont property to preserve communication with the landing place.

How these orders were observed may be ascertained from the descriptions given of the movements of the army on the 13th of September, by the various writers hereinafter cited.

The next authority is Brigadier-General Townshend, upon whom devolved the command of the forces after Wolfe received his fatal

wound, early in the engagement. The extract is taken from an official account of the action addressed to the Right Honourable William Pitt, Secretary of State, on the 20th of September, 1759, seven days after the event.

"The boats fell down with the tide, and landed on the north shore, within a league of Cape Diamond, an hour before day-break; the rapidity of the tide of ebb carried them a little below the intended place of attack, which obliged the light infantry to scramble up a woody precipice in order to secure the landing of the troops by dislodging a Captain's post, which defended the small entrenched path the troops were to ascend. After a little firing the light infantry gained the top of the precipice, and dispersed the Captain's post, by which means the troops, with a very little loss from a few Canadians and Indians in the wood, got up and were immediately formed. The boats as they emptied, were sent back for the second embarkation, which I immediately made. Brigadier Murray, who had been detached with Anstruther's battalion to attack the four-gun battery upon the left, was recalled by the General, who now saw the French army crossing the River St. Charles."

"General Wolfe thereupon began to form his line, having his right covered by the Louisbourg Grenadiers; on the right of these again he afterwards brought Otway's; to the left of the Grenadiers were Bragg's, Kennedy's, Lascelle's, Highlanders and Anstruther's; the right of this body was commanded by Brigadier Monckton, and on the left by Brigadier Murray; the rear and the left were protected by Colonel Howe's light infantry, who was returned from the four-gun battery, before mentioned, which was soon abandoned to him. General Montcalm having collected the whole of his force from the Beauport side, and advancing, showed his intention to flank our left, where I was immediately ordered with General Amherst's battalion, which I formed *en potence*. My numbers were soon increased by the arrival of the two battalions of Royal Americans, and Webb's was drawn up by the General, as a reserve, in eight sub-divisions, with large intervals. The enemy lined the bushes in their front with fifteen hundred Indians and Canadians, and I dare say, had placed most of their best marksmen there, who kept up a very galling, though irregular fire upon our whole line, who bore it with the greatest patience and good order, reserving their fire for the main body, now advancing. This fire of the enemy was, however, checked by our posts in front, which protected the forming of our own line. The right of the enemy was composed of half of the troops of the colony, the

"battalions of Bearn and Guienne. Their left was composed of the  
"remainder of the troops of the colony, and the battalion of Royal  
"Roussillon. This was, as near as I can guess, their line of battle.  
"They brought up two pieces of small artillery against us, and we had  
"been able to bring up but one gun, which, being admirably served,  
"galled their column exceedingly. My attention to the left will not  
"permit me to be very exact, with regard to every circumstance which  
"passed in the centre, much less to the right; but it is most certain  
"that the enemy formed in good order, and that their attack was very  
"brisk and animated on that side. Our troops reserved their fire till  
"within forty yards, which was so well continued, that the enemy  
"everywhere gave way. It was then that our General fell at the head  
"of Bragg's and the Louisbourg Grenadiers, advancing with their  
"bayonets; about the same time General Monckton received his wound  
"at the head of Lascelle's.

"In front of the opposite battalions fell also M. Montcalm, and his  
"second in command is since dead of his wounds on board our fleet.  
"Part of the enemy made a second faint attack; part took to some  
"thick coppice wood and seemed to make a stand. It was at this  
"moment that each corps seemed in a manner to exert itself with a  
"view to its own character. The Grenadiers, Bragg's, Kennedy's and  
"Lascelle's pressed on with bayonets, Brigadier Murray advancing  
"briskly with the troops under his command, completed the route on  
"this side, when the Highlanders, supported by Anstruther's, took to  
"their broad swords, and drove part into the town, and part to their  
"works at the bridge on the River St. Charles.

"The action on our left was not so severe. The houses into which  
"the light infantry were thrown, were so well defended, being sup-  
"ported by Colonel Howe, who taking post with two companies behind  
"a small coppice, and frequently sallying upon the flanks of the enemy  
"during their attack drove them often into heaps; against the front of  
"which I advanced platoons of Amherst's regiment, which totally pre-  
"vented the right wing from executing their first intention. Before  
"this, one of the Royal American battalions had been detached to pre-  
"serve our communication with our boats; and the other being sent to  
"occupy the ground which Brigadier Murray's movement had left open.  
"I remained with Amherst's to support this disposition, and to keep  
"back the enemy's right, and a body of savages, which waited still  
"more towards our rear, opposite to the posts of our light infantry,  
"waiting for an opportunity to fall upon our rear."

The despatch of Townshend is of special value for the following reasons :—

1. It is the official account of the action forwarded to England a few days after the event.

2. Because it gives precise details of the disposition of the army made by Wolfe, and agrees exactly with the order of the regiments as described on plan B.

3. It defines the position of the houses occupied by the light infantry as being opposite to a band of Indians, who waited for an opportunity to fall upon the rear of the English line on the left, and the houses are described in this position on the plan.

4. It mentions the position of the four-gun battery which Wolfe desired to capture on gaining the high ground, near the Marchmont property, as being on the left of the landing place ; and on the plan the battery is shown to be on the left.

It is necessary to note particularly the position of this battery, because it is claimed by Mr. Hawkins that the field was commanded by a four-gun battery, the "ruins of which were seen near the race course" in (1834).

By referring to plan No. 1 or plan B, it will be seen that the guns command the river, and not the field, and, moreover, on the drawing made by the aide-de-camp of General Wolfe, some houses are shown to intervene between the battery and the field. If the battery had been in the position indicated by Mr. Hawkins, it would have been on the right of the landing place.

The ruins of a battery, or redoubt, are described on a plan dated 1785, attributed to Major Holland, but I have been unable to find any evidence proving that a battery existed there in 1759.<sup>3</sup> The Chevalier de Montreuil, in a letter addressed to the Minister, nine days after the battle, mentions that a post was situated between L'Anse des Mères and Foulon, about three-eighths of a mile north. "*L'échec que nous avons eu le malheur d'essuyer le 13 de ce mois, sur les hauteurs de Québec, a été occasionné par la surprise d'un poste entre L'Anse des Mères et celle du Foulon, à la distance d'un demi quart de lieue au Nord audessus de Québec.*" This would be near the position mentioned on the plan. On a plan published by Mr. Hawkins in 1841, seven years after the publication of his book "*Picture of Quebec,*" the location of this battery is described as "*a redoubt to preserve communication with the boats,*" and no mention is made of a four-gun battery in this direction. It would appear, therefore, that at the time of the engagement this ground was occupied as a French post, and that

the redoubt was constructed by the English after the battle. Further testimony on this point will be offered, all of which confirms the statement made by Townshend, that the battery was on the left of the landing place, as indicated on the plan and on the drawing.

Another important passage in the despatch, bearing particularly upon the orders of Wolfe is, that during the engagement, a detachment was sent to preserve communication with the boats. As this fact would seem to furnish proof that no engagement occurred on the Marchmont property, immediately above the landing, the question will be more fully considered in connection with the further testimony of Knox, quoted from his journal, under the date of September 13th, 1759.

"Before day-break this morning we made a descent upon the north shore, about half of a quarter of a mile eastward of Sillery, and the light troops were fortunately, by the rapidity of the current, carried lower down, between us and Cape Diamond; we had in this debarkation, thirty flat-bottomed boats, containing about sixteen hundred men. This was a great surprise on the enemy, who, from the natural strength of the place, did not suspect, and consequently were not prepared against, so bold an attempt. The chain of sentries, which had been posted along the summit of the heights, galled us a little, and picked off several men, and a few officers, before our light infantry got up to dislodge them. This grand enterprise was conducted and executed with great good order and discretion. . . . As soon as we gained the summit, all was quiet, and not a shot was heard, owing to the excellent conduct of the light infantry under Colonel Howe; it was by this time clear daylight. Here we formed again, the river and the south country in our rear, our right extending to the town, our left to Sillery, and halted a few minutes.

"The general then detached the light troops to our left to route the enemy from their battery,<sup>4</sup> and to disable their guns, except they could be rendered serviceable to the party who were to remain there, and this service was soon performed." [It will be seen from this last statement, that when the army was formed parallel with the River St. Lawrence, facing the north, the four-gun battery was upon the left, and therefore, it could not have been in the position indicated by Mr. Hawkins in "Picture of Quebec."]

"We then faced to the right and marched towards the town by files, till we came to the Plains of Abraham, an even piece of ground which Mr. Wolfe had made choice of while we stood forming upon the hill.<sup>5</sup> Weather showery; about six o'clock the enemy first made their appearance upon the heights, between us and the town, where-

"upon we halted, and wheeled to the right, thereby forming the line of  
 "battle. Quebec was then to the eastward of us in the front, with the  
 "enemy under its walls. Our right was flanked by the declivity and  
 "the main river to the southward, and what is called the lower road  
 "leading (westward) from the town, with the river St. Charles and the  
 "north country, were upon our left. If the reader will attend to this  
 "description, observing the cardinal points, he may thereby form as  
 "lively an idea of the battle as if a plan were laid before him, and  
 "though our first disposition was afterwards altered, yet our situation,  
 "with that of the enemy, and the scene of action, could not vary. The  
 "first disposition then was: Grenadiers of Louisbourg on the right,  
 "Forty-seventh regiment (Lascelle's) on the left, Twenty-eighth  
 "(Bragg's) on the right, and Forty-third (Kennedy's) on the left; part  
 "of the light infantry took post in the houses at Sillery, and the re-  
 "mainder occupied a chain of houses which were opportunely situated  
 "for the purpose, and covered our left flank, inclining towards our  
 "rear; the General then advanced some platoons from the Grenadiers  
 "and the Twenty-eighth regiment (Bragg's) below the height on our  
 "right, to annoy the enemy, and to prevent their getting round the  
 "declivity between us and the main river, which they had attempted.  
 "By this time the Fifteenth (Amherst's) and the Thirty-fifth (Otway's)  
 "regiments joined us, who formed a second line, and we were soon after  
 "followed by the Forty-eighth (Webb's) and the Fifty-eighth; (An-  
 "struther's) two battalions of the Sixtieth (Monckton's) and Seventy-  
 "eighth regiments (Highlanders) (Fraser's), by which a new disposi-  
 "tion was made of the whole; viz: 'first line, Thirty-fifth (Otway's) to  
 "the right on a circular form on the slope of the hill; Fifty-eighth (An-  
 "struther's) left; Grenadiers (22nd, 40th, 45th) right; Seventy-eighth  
 "(Fraser's) left; Twenty-eighth (Bragg's) right; Forty-seventh (Las-  
 "celle's) left; Forty-third (Kennedy's) in centre.'

"General Wolfe, Brigadiers Monckton and Murray to our front  
 "line, and the second was composed of the Fifteenth and two battalions  
 "of the Sixtieth regiment, under Brigadier Townshend, with a reserve  
 "of the Forty-eighth regiment, under Colonel Burton, drawn up in  
 "four grand divisions, with large intervals. The enemy now like-  
 "wise formed their line of battle, and got some cannon to play on us,  
 "with round and canister shot, but what galled us most was a body of  
 "Indians and other marksmen they had concealed in the corn opposite  
 "to the front of our right wing, and a coppice that stood opposite to  
 "our centre, inclining towards our left, but the Colonel Hale, by Briga-  
 "dier Monckton's orders, advanced some platoons, alternately from the



"Forty-seventh regiment, which after a few rounds obliged these skulkers to retire. We were now ordered to lie down, and remained some time in this position. About eight o'clock we had two pieces of short brass six-pounders playing against the enemy, which threw them into some confusion, and obliged them to alter their disposition, and Montcalm formed them into three large columns; about nine the two armies moved a little nearer to each other. The light cavalry had made a faint attempt upon our parties at the battery at Sillery, but were soon beat off, and Monsieur de Bougainville, with his troops from Cape Rouge, came down to attack the flank of our second line, hoping to penetrate there, but by a masterly disposition of Brigadier Townshend, they were forced to desist, and the third battalion of Royal Americans was then detached to the first ground we had formed on after we had gained the heights, to preserve communication with the beach and our boats. About ten o'clock the enemy began to advance briskly in three columns, with loud shouts and recovered arms, two of them inclining to the left of our army, and the third towards our right, firing obliquely at the two extremities of our line from the distance of one hundred and thirty—until they came within forty yards; which our troops withstood with the greatest intrepidity and firmness, still reserving their fire, and paying the strictest obedience to their officers; this uncommon steadiness, together with the havoc which the grape shot from our field pieces made among them, threw them into some disorder, and was most critically maintained by a well timed, regular, and heavy discharge of our small arms, such as they could no longer oppose; hereupon they gave way and fled with precipitation so that, by the time the cloud of smoke had vanished, our men were again loaded, and, profiting by the advantage we had over them, pursued them almost to the gates of the town, and the bridge over the little river."

In this portion of his journal Knox refers to the corps by numbers, but on page 74 of his work, I find a table in which the names of the regiments are given. I have, therefore, placed the names in brackets after the numbers, for convenience of reference. It would appear from this account that the first disposition of the line was made from a point about midway between the cliff and the Grande Allée on the right, and from a point midway between Ste. Foye Road and the Grande Allée on the left, and that the second disposition extended the line on the right to the cliff, and on the left to near Cote Ste. Geneviève. This was probably the final disposition of the army made by Wolfe, immediately before the decisive firing, about ten o'clock.

At the commencement of this extract, Knox states that owing to the excellent conduct of the light infantry, not a shot was heard after the army gained the summit; that is, in the vicinity of the race course or the Marchmont property. So far, then, there was no engagement near the landing place. Here the army formed and marched along the St. Foye Road towards the town. "And soon gained the great road to St. Foye, along which they marched in regular order." (Knox, page 74.) It is worth noticing, that if the four-gun battery had been in the position claimed by Mr. Hawkins, the army would have been compelled to pass it on its march towards the town, and therefore, I think we may conclude that there was no battery here at the time, especially as Knox reports, that after the summit was gained, all was quiet.

While dealing with the ground in the vicinity of the race course, we refer again to the despatch of Townshend, where mention is made that during the engagement, troops were sent to preserve communication with the boats. Knox gives the time at which troops were sent for this purpose, namely, after the line was formed. This was several hours after the landing of the army, and after the French were well in sight. . . . "About nine the two armies moved a little nearer to each other. . . . the third battalion of Royal Americans was then detached "to the first ground we had formed on after we had gained the heights, "to preserve communication with the beach and our boats." This proves, I think, that the line of battle was not in the vicinity of the Marchmont property or landing place (see Plan No. 1), because if it had been here, communication would have been insured by the presence of the whole army in its immediate neighbourhood.

The testimony of Knox agrees with that of Townshend on this point, and confirms the evidence afforded by Plan B, that the line of battle was a long distance from the landing place.

Before considering the more important points, such as the exact distance of the English line from the walls of the city at the time of the decisive firing, it is advisable to quote from the journal of Colonel Malcolm Fraser, who served under Wolfe on the 13th of September, 1759.

"Thursday, 13th September (1759). The Light Infantry under "the command of Colonel Howe, immediately landed and mounted the "hill. We were fired on in the boats by the enemy who killed and "wounded a few. In a short time the whole army had landed at a "place called Le Foulon (now Wolfe's Cove), about a mile and a half "above the town of Quebec,\* and immediately followed the light in-

infantry up the hill. There was a few tents and a picket of the French "on the top of the hill, whom the light infantry engaged" and took "some of their officers and men prisoners. The main body of our army "soon got to the upper ground after climbing a hill or rather a precipice, of about three hundred yards, very steep and covered with wood "and brush. We had several skirmishes with the Canadians and savages, till about ten o'clock, when the army formed in line of battle, "having the great River St. Lawrence on the right with the precipice "which we mounted in the morning; on the left a few houses and at "some distance the low ground and wood above the General Hospital "with the River St. Charles; in front the town of Quebec, about a mile "distant; in the rear, a wood occupied by the light infantry (who by "this time had taken possession of the French four-gun battery) and "the third battalion of the Royal Americans. In the space between "which last and the main body, the Forty-eighth was drawn up as a "body of reserve. The army was ordered to march on slowly in line of "battle, and halt several times, till about half an hour after ten, when "the French began to appear in great numbers on the rising ground "between us and the town, and having advanced several parties to "skirmish with us; we did the like. They then got two iron field "pieces to play against our line. Before eleven o'clock we got one "brass field piece up the hill, which being placed in the proper interval "began to play very smartly on the enemy while forming on the little "eminence.

"Their advanced parties continued to annoy us and wounded a "great many men. About this time we observed the enemy formed, "having a bush of short brush wood on their right, which straightened "them in room, and obliged them to form in columns. About eleven "o'clock the French army advanced in columns till they got past the "bush of wood into the plain, when they endeavoured to form in line "of battle, but being galled by our artillery, which consisted of only "one field piece, very well served, we observed them in some confusion. "However, they advanced at a brisk pace till within about thirty or "forty yards of our front, when they gave us the first fire, which did "little execution. We returned it, and continued firing very hot for "about six, or (as some say) eight minutes, when the fire slackening, "and the smoke of the powder vanishing, we observed the main body "of the enemy retreating towards the town, and the rest towards "the River St. Charles. Our regiments were then ordered by Brigadier Murray to draw their swords and pursue them; which I dare say "increased their panic but saved many of their lives, whereas, if the

"artillery had been allowed to play and the army advanced regularly  
"there would have been many more of the enemy killed and wounded,  
"as we never came up with the main body. In advancing we passed  
"over a great many dead and wounded, (French regulars mostly) lying  
"in front of our regiment, who—I mean the Highlanders—to do them  
"justice, behaved extremely well all day, as did the whole army. After  
"pursuing the French to the very gates of the town, our regiment was  
"ordered to form fronting the town, on the ground whereon the French  
"formed first."

The French army, according to the Chevalier Johnstone, who served under General Montcalm, was drawn up in line of battle at a distance of four hundred yards from the city walls, and this distance may be roughly estimated as about midway between the walls of the city and Claire Fontaine Street. "His town," as he called it—was "defended by our army which covered it, being drawn up in battle "about two hundred fathoms from it." (Johnstone, page 42.)

Fraser, therefore, agrees with Johnstone on this point.

We continue the quotation from the journal of Fraser. "At this  
"time, the rest of the army came up in good order, General Murray  
"having then put himself at the head of our regiment, ordered them  
"to face to the left and march through the bush of wood towards the  
"General Hospital, when they got a great gun to play upon us from the  
"town, which, however, did no damage, but we had a few men killed  
"and officers wounded by some skulking fellows with small arms, from  
"the bushes and behind the houses in the suburbs of St. Louis and St.  
"John. After marching a short way through the brush, Brigadier  
"Murray thought proper to order us to return again to the high road  
"leading from Porte St. Louis to the Heights of Abraham, where the  
"battle was fought, and after marching till we got clear of the bushes,  
"we were ordered to turn to the right and go along the edge of them  
"towards the bank, at the descent between us and the General Hos-  
"pital, under which we understood there was a body of the enemy who,  
"no sooner saw us, than they began firing on us from the bushes  
"and from the bank; we soon dispossessed them from the bushes, and  
"from thence kept firing for about a quarter of an hour on those under  
"cover of the bank, but as they exceeded us greatly in numbers, they  
"killed and wounded a great many of our men, and killed two officers,  
"which obliged us to retire a little, and form again, when the 58th  
"Regiment with the 2nd battalion of Royal Americans having come  
"up to our assistance, all three making about five hundred men, ad-  
"vanced against the enemy and drove them first down to the great

"meadow between the hospital and town and afterwards over the River St. Charles. It was at this time and while in the bushes that our regiment suffered most."

From the writings of those already quoted, and who were present on the occasion, we have indications of the place where the battle occurred. Knox and Fraser, however, furnish still stronger proof, and give the exact distance from the city. On page 76 of the journal of Knox this passage is found: "Every coppice, brush, or other cover, that stood on our ground this morning, were cut down before night, and applied to the use of our new works; the houses were all fortified, and several redoubts thrown up round our camp, which is about one thousand yards from the garrison." And in the journal of Fraser, under the date of the 14th of September, these words occur: "We got ashore our tents and encamped our regiment where they fought the battle yesterday." The battle, therefore, according to these two officers who were present, was fought at a distance of about one thousand yards from the walls of the city. One thousand yards from the walls is about midway between the English and French lines, as indicated on Plan A.

Townshend, Fraser and Knox, each mention houses situated on the left of the English line; and on Plan B, some houses are shown about 140 yards west of de Salaberry Street. This would nearly agree with Fraser, who estimates their distance at about a mile from the city. Knox gives more definite information, and names one of the proprietors.


On page 97 of his journal a quotation is given from a French manuscript which was brought to him, and which Knox says forms a sequel to his own, "The British having now no enemy to oppose them, on the morning of the 13th scaled the mountain without difficulty, and soon gained the great road to St. Foy, along which they marched in regular order. Our troops instantly stood to their arms, filed to the right, and crossed the rivulet of St. Charles, leaving a detachment of fifteen hundred men only in our camp for its defence; we took post on the heights of Abraham, and there awaited the arrival of the enemy. General Wolfe, upon first coming up, had ordered a party of light infantry to take possession of the house de Borgia from which we attempted to dislodge them; but, after a spirited and obstinate attack, we found our efforts without cannon, to little purpose."

On a plan made by Noel Levasseur, in 1766, seven years after the event, Borgia's property is shown to be 100 yards east of Maple Avenue, on the St. Foye Road. The Chevalier Johnstone also mentions Borgia's

house. On page 43, I find these words: "In effect, a movement your army made in that moment towards the windmill and Borgia's house, upon the edge of the height, seemed to favour this conjecture. But an instant afterwards, the Canadians having set fire to that house and chased you from it, you retook your former position." I am inclined to think that Johnstone did not refer to the property near Maple Avenue, because on another plan made in 1790, I find that a Borgia owned a property near Claire Fontaine, and close to this property, on the edge of the bank, there is a windmill clearly marked. The English, according to Johnstone, did not occupy this property near Claire Fontaine or capture the windmill. Before they could do so the Canadians had set fire to it. Knox, however, states that the houses were towards the rear of the left of the English line, and therefore, it seems clear that the Borgia property he refers to was the one near Maple Avenue, which agrees exactly with the position of the army as described on the plan. From a careful search among deeds relating to property in this direction, about the time of the battle, I find that there were several properties between Claire Fontaine Street and Maple Avenue, but so far, I have been unable to discover any consecutive row or "chain of houses" west of Maple Avenue.

Colonel Fraser's evidence affords another means of ascertaining the distance of the English line from the city. He states that when the line was first formed, Quebec was about a mile distant. A mile from the city walls is quite near the present toll gate. (See toll gate on Grande Allée, plan A.) Colonel Fraser does not give this as the place where the battle was fought. He adds, that for the space of half an hour after the line was formed, the army marched on slowly and halted several times. "The army was ordered to march on slowly in line of battle, and halt several times, till about half an hour after ten, when the French began to appear in great numbers on the rising ground between us and the town." By referring to Plan A, it will be seen that a very short march would be necessary to bring the army to the line indicated on the plan. Captain Knox also gives some definite information on this point. At ten o'clock, when the final disposition of the army was made, the Thirty-fifth regiment on the right of the English, was disposed in a circular form on the slope of the hill, and from that time "our situation with that of the enemy, and scene of action, could not vary." It will be seen from the profile on plan No. 1, that the only elevations of any importance on the right of the English, between the city walls and Marchmont, are the points marked A and B. The right of the English line was not formed on the highest





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[DOUGHTY]

## BATTLE OF THE PLAINS



# BATTLE OF THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM

TRANS. R. S. C., 1899, PLAN A.



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point of this hill, but on the slope. (This position will be better understood by a reference to the indications of the "ridge" and the "slope of the hill" on plan No. 1.) This was before the battle commenced, when according to Knox and Fraser, the French were still on the rising ground between the English and the town. We have shown that the only rising ground near the town, is Claire Fontaine.

The distance between the highest point of the ridge and the highest point of the hill, is about 500 yards; that is, between the points A and B on the profile.

It may be advisable to ascertain how this position agrees with plan A, and also with the further testimony of those present on the day of the battle.

Knox informs us that "at ten o'clock the enemy began to advance briskly in three columns, with loud shouts and recovered arms, two of them inclining to the left of our army, and the third towards our right, firing obliquely at the two extremities of our line, from a distance of one hundred and thirty—till they came within forty yards." Here we have a distance given of one hundred and thirty yards.

How far had the French advanced from the ridge, Claire Fontaine, at this time? We can ascertain this better from another source.

The authority here cited is General Malartic, who served with the regiment of Béarn under Montcalm. On page 283 of his Journal, published at Dijon, he gives a clear account of the movements of the French army on the 13th of September, 1759. The Journal is in French, but I believe the summary I have made to be sufficiently accurate.

On the 13th the water patrol sent word that they heard many boats passing towards the town. At two o'clock the troops were ordered to make for the entrenchments. At the first break of day we heard the cannon from Samos, and some few muskets discharged from the adjoining parts of L'Anse des Mères. The regiment of Guienne was ordered to send two pickets to Abraham's Hill, and to march there in full force, half an hour later. Monsieur de Montcalm has taken position at La Canardière.

Intelligence came to him that the enemy had disembarked between Le Foulon and L'Anse des Mères. The General ordered to be sent there, one picket from each battalion, and 600 of the Montreal men. He (Montcalm) followed them closely, leaving M. de Senesergue, Brigadier-Lieutenant-Colonel of LaSarre, in the Beauport part, with orders for the men of the Government of Three Rivers, and one hundred of the Quebec men to follow him; and the regiment of LaSarre was to be sent to him, as soon as 400 of M. Leborgne's men would arrive.

From the bridge he sent an order to LaSarre, Languedoc, and the 400 men of M. Leborgne, to march with all diligence.

Two minutes later another order commanded Béarn to march, who on the way met the Major-General, and was informed by him that the English were already in battle opposite the city—that he (the Major-General) was going for Royal Roussillon and other troops, and that they were to follow the same road and gain the heights nearest the town. (*Les plus près de la ville*).

He (Montcalm) arrived at nine o'clock and placed himself between Languedoc and Guienne. The Royal Roussillon joined them half an hour later and took the left. Some platoons of soldiers of the colony, and some Canadians were exchanging shots with the English from behind some brushwood and stones, which were between the two armies (*en avant des deux armées*). The English, who had their field guns, annoyed us very much with their grape shot. Two guns were sent to us from the town at half past nine, and were placed on the right, from where a few discharges were made. The rest of the Government men arrived at the same hour.

M. de Montcalm passed along the front of the army composed of 2,500 men, and inquired if they were fatigued, and observed the movements of the enemy. Having seen that they were reinforcing, and fearing that they would turn the right of our army, he commanded a march towards them. The regiments pushed forward with good grace, but they had hardly advanced one hundred paces, when the Canadians forming the first line, and the soldiers of the third, fired in an irregular manner, and according to their custom, threw themselves flat upon the ground to reload. This false movement had the effect of breaking up all the battalions. Most of the soldiers of the first line were either killed or wounded by the discharges of the English who were situated on an elevated ground. Those who had thrown themselves upon the ground, after rising made a half turn to the right, took to the city road and went into the suburbs, without it being possible to rally them. M. de Montcalm, wounded in the abdomen, had to be carried into the city. The Major-General ordered that the borders of the suburbs should be lined with troops; a quarter of an hour later, each battalion was ordered to send a picket into the city, and the rest of the army to make for the bridges. M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil, who before the route had come up to the heights, persuaded the Canadians to come up again, but after a few moments firing with the English, they were forced to retire.

From this evidence we learn, that at some time after half past nine, when the French were still close to the town, on the high ground, the



western extremity of which is Buttes à Neveu, or Claire Fontaine, the troops advanced with good grace, but they had only proceeded a distance of 100 paces, when a false movement on the part of the Canadians, disorganized the rest of the battalions, and most of the soldiers of the first line were either killed or wounded by the discharges of the English.

A large number of the French were therefore killed at a distance of about 100 yards from Claire Fontaine.

This statement agrees with Knox, who writes that the camp, after the battle was formed at a distance of 1000 yards from the garrison, and that on the following day, "a flag of truce came from the garrison" "this afternoon, requesting permission to bury their dead; all that were "within our reach we had interred before."

If the camp were situated at a distance of 1000 yards from the walls, as stated by Knox; and most of the soldiers of the front line were killed at a distance of one hundred paces from the ridge, or Claire Fontaine, as claimed by Malartic, then the place where the French fell would be about 150 yards in front of the camp. We, therefore, find a close agreement between Malartic on the part of the French, and Knox, on the part of the English. We will now estimate the distance by figures furnished by each of these sources.

Knox states that the French began firing when at a distance of 130 yards from the English, and Malartic says that the French began to fire after they had advanced 100 paces from their ground (Claire Fontaine).

The 130 yards given by Knox, added to the 100 paces given by Malartic, make a total of about 230 yards.

The distance separating the two armies on plan A, presumably before any advance was made (that is just before the battle) is 400 yards. The advance made by the French of 100 paces, must therefore, be deducted from the 400 yards, and this would leave a discrepancy of about 70 yards in the figures furnished by Knox and Malartic. This apparently proves that the positions indicated on plan A are accurate.

We will now compare the lines indicated on plan A with measurements of the ground. The distance between the highest point of the ridge and the highest point of the hill, is about 500 yards. (That is the distance between points A and B on the profile). The distance between the English and French line on plan A is about 400 yards. There is, therefore, a difference of 100 yards, but when we consider that the English line was not formed on the highest point of the hill, but on the slope, the agreement appears very close. If the English line had

been formed on the Marchmont property near the race course, and the French were on the ridge, then the distance between the two armies would have been over three-quarters of a mile.

The Chevalier Johnstone, to whose writings we have referred before, gives further proof of the distance between the armies. On page 41 he refers to the proximity of the English line in these words: "I was no sooner upon the heights than I perceived our horrible position—pressed against the town walls, without provisions for four and twenty hours, and a moral impossibility for us to retire, being drawn up in battle within a musket shot of your army," and again, "'His town,' as he called it—was defended by our army which covered it, 'being drawn up in battle about 200 fathoms from it.'"

Here we have proof of the distance of the French from the walls of the city, and of the distance of the French line from the English line. Pressed against the city walls at a distance of 200 fathoms (400 yards) and within a musket shot of the English.

What was the distance of a musket shot?

Lieutenant-Colonel Crawford Lindsay has kindly furnished me with an extract from Chambers' Encyclopedia, 1882, wherein the range of the musket is thus described:—

Accurate fire....	100 yards.
Effective against detached parties..	150 "
Effective against troops in column....	200 "

And from another source I learn that the maximum range was not more than 250 yards.

We have seen that the distance from Claire Fontaine, where the French were drawn up, according to several authorities, to Marchmont, is over three-quarters of a mile, and we can hardly believe that a soldier would refer to a distance of 1,320 yards as a musket shot, when the maximum range of the weapon was not more than 250 yards.

Proof that the French and English each had the advantage of an elevated ground is afforded by a journal of the French army, under date of September 13th.

"L'éminence sur laquelle la nôtre était rangée en bataille dominait, dans quelques points celle qu'occupait les Anglais qui y étaient couverts, soit par des ravins peu profonds, soit par des clôtures de champ en palissades; nos troupes presque toutes composées de Canadiens fondirent sur l'ennemi avec impétuosité, mais leurs rangs mal formés se rompirent bientôt, soit par la précipitation avec laquelle on les fit marcher, soit par l'inégalité du terrain; les Anglais en bon

"ordre essayèrent sans s'ébranler nos premières décharges. Ils riposèrent ensuite avec beaucoup de vivacité, et le mouvement qu'un détachement de leur centre d'environ 200 hommes fit en avant, la bayonnette au bout du fusil, suffit pour faire prendre la fuite à presque toute notre armée; la déroute ne fut totale que parmi les troupes réglées; les Canadiens accoutumés à reculer à la manière des Sauvages, (et des anciens Parthes) et à retourner ensuite à l'ennemi avec plus de confiance qu'auparavant se rallièrent en quelques endroits, et à la faveur des *petits bois* dont ils étaient environnés, ils forcèrent différents corps à plier, mais enfin il fallut céder à la supériorité du nombre."

By this evidence it is seen that the eminence on which the French army was drawn up, was greater than the elevated ground occupied by the English. This agrees exactly with the profile, on which the two elevations are denoted by the letters A and B. It may be interesting to those who are unfamiliar with the city of Quebec, to obtain a few particulars regarding the different levels and the appearance of the ground between the ridge, Claire Fontaine, and the hill; and also between the hill and the centre of the race course, in 1785. The profile, on plan No. 1, gives the elevation of the ground at the particular place designated, but it is not a correct representation of the whole of the ground between the River St. Lawrence and Cote Ste. Geneviève. Many profiles would be necessary for this purpose.

The appearance of the ground between the fortifications of the city and the toll gate on the Grande Allée is deceptive, on account of the number of houses which have been erected. Even a close inspection from available points does not enable one to form a very clear idea of what its aspect could have been at the time of the battle.

Fortunately, a large ordnance map on which the elevations of all this portion of Quebec are marked, has been preserved. This map is attributed to Major Holland, and the elevations on it were taken from the River St. Lawrence during the years 1785-86. It is true that this map was made 26 years after the battle, but it is not probable that there was much alteration during the interval. In order to understand certain passages of the text, it is necessary to have a knowledge of the surface of the ground upon which the battle was fought. A few explanations will be given concerning the levels of the race course, and also of the ground on the south of Grande Allée between the Quebec gaol and Claire Fontaine, at a period 26 years after the event.

We will draw an imaginary line from about the centre of the race course to the summit of the hill upon which the Quebec gaol now stands. The line is nearly parallel with the River St. Lawrence, about

400 yards north; and it is about 500 yards in length. At its commencement, near the centre of the race course, the elevation is 271 feet above the River St. Lawrence. From this point there is almost a gradual rise for a distance of 400 yards, at which point the elevation is 303 feet; showing a rise of 32 feet in a distance of 400 yards. From this point to the end of the line, the difference is between the elevations 303 and 321, showing a rise of 18 feet in 400 yards, and a total rise of 50 feet in 500 yards.

We will now examine the levels of the ground to the south of the Grande Allée, between de Salaberry street and a point west of Claire Fontaine. We will draw an imaginary line nearly parallel with the River St. Lawrence, about 350 yards north. The length of the line is about 400 yards. Commencing at the Quebec gaol, the elevation is 321 feet, and proceeding along the line at intervals of 200 feet the figures are 303, 313, 301, 296, 307, 315. On another line parallel with this, 125 yards from the Grande Allée, the figures are 301, 304, 311, 310, 310, 311. The ground in this direction, nearer to the river, is still more uneven. Here we find levels at a distance of 200 feet, varying between 225 and 285 feet; a difference of 60 feet, in 200 feet.

The ground to-day between Claire Fontaine and the gaol is very uneven, especially at a distance of about 150 yards from the river. At one place, probably 150 yards from the gaol, there is a hillock, and this is no doubt the "petite colline" referred to in the journal of the French army. "Les deux armées séparées par une petite colline se canonnaient depuis environ une heure."

This "petite colline" which *separated* the two armies could not have been the hill upon which the gaol is situated, because the context explains, that the English occupied an eminence. "L'émminence sur laquelle la nôtre était rangée en bataille dominait, dans quelques points celle qu'occupait les Anglais."

Mention is also made in the journal of the French army, which has already been quoted, of the inequality of the ground between the two armies, and this appears to agree with the descriptions of the ground here given.

Captain Knox speaks of the ground upon which the army halted after its march towards the town in files, as being an "even piece of ground which Mr. Wolfe had made choice of." The most even piece of ground that I find described on Major Holland's plan, is between the Grande Allée and the St. Foye or St. John's Road. Drawing a line parallel with this road 100 yards south, from a point at right angles

with the boundary of the race course property, and proceeding from this point a distance of 2,800 feet towards Claire Fontaine, the ground is almost flat.

The elevation at the western extremity of this line is 269 feet, and the elevation at the eastern extremity of the line is 271 feet, showing a variation of two feet in a distance of 2,800 feet. Another line parallel with this, 2,000 feet south, (100 yards south of Grande Allée) gives a variation of 24 feet in this distance of 2,800 feet.

From this plan it is apparent that the most even piece of ground was north of the Grande Allée, and the most uneven ground was between the River St. Lawrence and the Grande Allée, bounded on the west by the race course, and on the east by Claire Fontaine.

While considering the appearance of the surface of the ground, it may be interesting to note that a coppice of several hundred feet in area, is shown on this plan, nearly midway between de Salaberry Street and Claire Fontaine, on the St. John's Road. This position, it will be observed, is in the vicinity of the Canadians on the right of the French army, on plan A, and between the English and French lines. Referring to the testimony of Townshend, we find that "the enemy lined the bushes in their front with fifteen hundred Indians and Canadians, and, I daresay, had placed most of their best marksmen there, who kept up a very galling, though irregular fire, upon our whole line."

Knox also refers to this coppice. "But what galled us most was a body of Indians and other marksmen they had concealed in the corn opposite to the front of our right wing, and a coppice that stood opposite to our centre, inclining towards our left."

General Malartic informs us that after the French army gained the heights, "some platoons of soldiers of the colony were exchanging shots with the English from behind some brushwood and stones" (fredoche ?) which were between the two armies."

The late George Desbarats published in 1871, a Journal of the Siege of Quebec, "by An Officer of the Expedition," bearing the initials, P. M. (Major Moncrief).

At the time of the publication of this journal its authorship was disputed, as it was proved to be an exact copy of the journal of Mr. James Thompson, of Quebec.

Mr. Thompson is said to have assisted Mr. Hawkins in the preparation of his book, "Picture of Quebec."

It is therefore interesting to be able to refer to this source.

In this journal the coppice is described as being situated between the two armies. "In the space between the two armies were some

"clumps of high brush which afforded good cover, and brought on a skirmishing which was warmly kept up on both sides, during the assembling and disposition of the troops for a general action.

"Their irregulars consisting of Canadians and Indians, were dispersed in flying parties on our flanks, particularly on our left, where they were very numerous, and before the charge of the main body, made some weak advances, as if they were about to attack us on this flank. But General Townshend having ordered two pickets of the Fifteenth to advance by turn, and fire on them, they hastily retired to a safe distance." This extract confirms, in every particular, the evidence of Townshend, Knox and Malartic, as to the position of this coppice or brush wood.

We have already shown that according to the evidence of Malartic, many of the French were killed at a short distance from Claire Fontaine. The Chevalier Johnstone also gives the place where many Canadians were killed.

On page 44, we find the passage, "The brave Canadian militia saw us with heavy hearts, grief and despair, from the other side of the St. Charles river, cut to pieces upon the heights, stopped as they were, in the horn work, and prevented by superior orders from rushing to our assistance. About 200 brave and resolute Canadians rallied in the hollow at the bakehouse,\* and returned upon the heights. They fell instantly upon your left wing with incredible rage; stopped your army for some minutes from pursuing our soldiers in their flight by attracting your attention to them; resisted, undaunted, the shock of your left, and when repulsed, they disputed the ground inch by inch from the top to the bottom of the height, pursued by your troops down the valley at the bakehouse, opposite to the hornwork. These unfortunate heroes—who were most of them cut to pieces—saved your army the loss of a great many men."

The journal of Major Moncrief, or Mr. James Thompson, from which we give a further extract, gives evidence of fighting and loss within a few yards of the city.

"They were by ten o'clock pursued within a musket shot (200 or 250 yards) of their own walls, and scarcely looked behind them till they got within them. Their irregulars upon our left moved towards the town when their line gave way, but still maintained their ground along the bank on that side, whence, under cover of some coppice and some brush they kept up a continual fire. Brigadier Murray, who with Fraser's battalion of Highlanders, the 78th, had pursued the enemy within musket shot of St. Ursula's bastion, being informed that all our generals were wounded and the enemy having totally

"disappeared, was now returning to the field of battle, but hearing the firing of the irregulars still continue, ordered the 78th to beat them off. A hot skirmish ensued in which the Highlanders suffered a good deal, but being reinforced by some of the 58th and a battalion of the Royal Americans, they drove the irregulars helter skelter into the suburb of St. Roch's and thence towards the bridge over the River St. Charles. We lay that night under arms and sent a detachment to take possession of the General Hospital, and such of the enemy as were wounded that day, and lay there, were made prisoners, the hospital being considered a part of the field of battle." (For the position of coppice and bakehouse, see plan No. 1).

From the evidence we have examined so far, the heavy losses appear to have occurred at a short distance from Claire Fontaine, probably on the right and left of the Grande Allée, and on the ground close to the borders of Cote Ste. Geneviève. A number of Canadians were killed still nearer to the city, and on the bank descending to the horn-work.

Vice-Admiral Saunders in command of the fleet before Quebec, in his letter addressed to the Right Honourable William Pitt, Secretary of State, on the 20th of September, 1759, describes many of the French as having been killed quite close to the walls of the city. "Our troops received their fire, and reserved their own, advancing till they were so near as to run in upon them and push them with their bayonets, by which, in a very little time, the French gave way and fled to the town in the utmost disorder, and with great loss, for our troops pursued them quite to the walls, and killed a great many of them upon the glacis and in the ditch." From these accounts, the whole of the ground east of Wolfe's monument was the battle-field, and as such is sacred.

The testimony that we have hitherto considered has been that of those who were present, and who took part in the engagement of the 13th of September, 1759. The Marquis de Vaudreuil, did not arrive on the field until just after the decisive firing, and therefore he was not an eye-witness of the whole of the battle. In a letter addressed by Vaudreuil to the Minister on the 21st of September, 1759, a brief description of the engagement is given, and although no new facts are presented, it is worth quoting. "J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte que la nuit du 12 au 13 de ce mois, le Général Wolfe ayant fait le débarquement de son armée à l'Anse des Mères, s'empara des hauteurs derrière Québec. M. le Marquis de Montcalm, qui en fut le premier informé, jugea, sans doute, que ce n'étoit qu'un détachement. Ce Général emporté par son zèle et sa grande vivacité, fit marcher les

"piquets des différens corps, partie des batalions, des Canadiens, et  
 "avança lui-même sans me faire part de ses dispositions... M. le Mar-  
 "quis de Montcalm attaqua malheureusement avant que je l'eusse  
 "joint ; il vit sa défaite dans le même moment, et le désordre si grand  
 "dans les troupes que forcé de se retirer, lui-même y fut blessé mor-  
 "tellement. Lorsque j'arrivai, Monseigneur, au champ de bataille, la  
 "fuite était si générale que je ne pus arrêter le soldat. Je ralliai en-  
 "viron 1,000 Canadiens, qui par leur bonne contenance, arrêtrèrent  
 "l'ennemi dans sa poursuite."

The Mayor of Quebec, M. Daine, writing to the minister on the  
 9th of October, 1759, speaks of the battle as having taken place quite  
 close to the walls of the city.

"J'ay aussi eu l'honneur de vous informer par ma précédente, que  
 "le 13 du même mois, nous avons perdu une bataille, *presque sous les*  
 "*murs de la ville.*"

The Intendant Bigot, who played such an important part in the  
 affairs of the colony, previous to the capitulation, furnishes some inter-  
 esting particulars concerning the battle, in a letter addressed to the  
 minister, on the 25th of October, 1759. Among other things we learn  
 that a lively engagement occurred near St. John's Gate.

"Enfin la nuit du 12 au 13, les ennemis s'embarquèrent dans des  
 "berges qui étaient à bord de leurs vaisseaux, et passèrent devant les  
 "postes què nous avions depuis celuy de M. de Bougainville, à la ville;  
 "quatre différentes sentinelles se contentèrent de leur crier 'qui vive?'  
 "ils répondirent: 'France,' on les laissa passer sans reconnaître.

"... Nous fûmes instruits, au jour, au camp, que quelques uns de  
 "nos postes audessus de Québec, avaient été attaqués. M. le Marquis  
 "de Montcalm qui ne comptait pas la chose si sérieuse, n'envoya d'abord  
 "à leur secours que quelques piquets, en se faisant suivre par une grande  
 "partie de notre armée; elle avait diminuée en bonté et en nombre  
 "par 3,000 hommes ou environ qui étaient aux ordres de M. de  
 "Bougainville; ils étaient tous d'élite puisqu'ils étaient composés de  
 "grenadiers et de volontaires de l'armée tant en troupes qu'en Cana-  
 "diens. M. le Mar. de Montcalm fut bien surpris lorsqu'il fut monté  
 "sur la hauteur derrière la ville, de voir l'armée Anglaise qui se formait  
 "dans la plaine. Il donna ordre de hâter la marche des corps qui  
 "venaient le joindre, et à peine furent-ils arrivés à lui, qu'il marcha  
 "à l'ennemi et l'attaqua. Ces différens corps, dont les bataillons de  
 "la Sarre, Royal Roussillon, Languedoc, Guienne et Béarn étaient, ne  
 "formaient que 3,500 hommes ou environ. Il y en avaient qui vena-  
 "ient d'une lieue et demie, ils n'avaient pas eu le tems de prendre  
 " haleine. Cette petite armée fit deux décharges sur celle des Anglaise,



"qui n'était pareillement que de 3 à 4 mille hommes, mais la nôtre prit malheureusement la fuite à la première décharge des ennemis, et elle aurait été entièrement détruite si 8 à 900 Canadiens ne se fussent jetés dans un petit bois qui est près de la Porte St. Jean, d'où ils firent un feu si nourri sur l'ennemi qu'il fut obligé de s'arrêter pour lui répondre. ....C'est dans cette retraite, que M. de Montcalm reçut une balle dans les reins comme il était prêt d'entrer en ville par la Porte St. Louis."

The Reverend John Entick, who published a history of the war in 5 vols. in 1763, also mentions the Canadians as being placed on the bank, and on the borders of the bank of Cote Ste. Geneviève, and on his plan, which is apparently the same as Jeffreys, the Canadians are shown to be in this direction.

From a relation by one of the nuns of the General Hospital, addressed to a member of the community in Paris, it appears that a portion of the engagement was witnessed from the windows of the hospital. "Nous vîmes de nos fenêtres ce massacre," and again, "l'ennemi, maître de la campagne et à deux pas de Notre Maison."

I have visited the General Hospital for the purpose of observing what portion of the ground is visible from the windows, and I do not think that any of the troops could have been seen who were upon the level ground. On the plan it will be noticed that the Canadians are placed on the sloping ground of Cote Ste. Geneviève, and if this position is correct, they would have been seen from the windows of the hospital. It would appear from the writings of Johnstone, that even before Montcalm arrived on the heights, fighting had taken place on this declivity between the Canadians and the English. "When opposite M. de Vaudreuil's lodgings, the first news of what had passed during the night was the sight of your army upon the Heights of Abraham, firing at the Canadians scattered among the bushes." Vaudreuil's lodgings were beyond the River St. Charles, and the only portion of the heights visible from this place would be the border, near Cote Ste. Geneviève.

All this evidence confirms the accuracy of the plan, so far as the position of the Canadians is concerned.

As many residents of the sister country have evinced a deep interest in the question of the site of the battle of the Plains of Abraham, it may be advisable to give an extract from the journal of a cultured American, Professor Siliman, of Yale College, who visited the battlefield early in the present century. Professor Siliman came to Quebec in the company of some officers, and he appears to have taken a deep interest in everything that he saw. He admits that from a boy he

longed to stand upon the spot where Wolfe died. The journal is dated 1819.

"The Plains of Abraham lie south and west of Quebec, and commence the moment you leave the walls of the city. The battle was particularly severe on the French left, and the English right. This ground is very near the St. Lawrence, and but a little distance in front of the Citadel, and all the events that passed there, must have been distinctly seen by those on the walls of Quebec." It must have been a most interesting spectacle, and we can easily enter into the feelings of the American French, who viewed their country and their city, and their firesides and homes, as involved in the issue of this battle. With what emotions then must they have seen their defenders, not only falling in the ranks, but driven by the furious onset of the enemy to the walls of the city, where they were slaughtered by the bayonet and the broad sword, on the very glaxis and in the ditches, immediately under their eyes."

A brief examination will now be made of the works of more modern authors. The first book we will take is "Montcalm and Wolfe," by Francis Parkman. The extract is from the second volume, page 282.

"He went to reconnoitre the ground, and soon came to the Plains of Abraham, so called from Abraham Martin, a pilot known as Maître Abraham, who had owned a piece of land here in the early days of the colony. The plains were a tract of grass tolerably level in most parts, patched here and there with cornfields, studded with clumps of bushes and forming a part of the high plateau at the eastern end of which Quebec stood. On the south it was bounded by the declivities along the St. Lawrence, on the north by those along the St. Charles, or rather along the meadows through which that lazy stream crawled like a writhing snake. At the place Wolfe chose for his battle-field, the plateau is less than a mile wide.

"Thither the troops advanced, marched along by files till they reached the ground, and then wheeled to form their line of battle, which stretched across the plateau and faced the city. It consisted of six battalions and the detached grenadiers of Louisbourg, all drawn up in ranks, three deep. Its right wing was near the brink of the heights along the St. Lawrence, but the left could not reach those along the St. Charles. On this side a space was perforce left open, and there was a danger of being outflanked. To prevent this, Brigadier Townshend was stationed here with two battalions drawn up at right angles with the rest and fronting the St. Charles. The battalion of Webb's regiment, under Colonel Burton, formed the reserve, the third battalion of Royal Americans was left to guard the landing,

"and Howe's light infantry occupied a wood far in the rear. Wolfe with Monckton and Murray, commanded the front line on which the heavy fighting was to fall, and which, when all the troops had arrived, numbered less than thirty-five hundred men.

"Quebec was not a mile distant, but they could not see it, for a ridge of broken ground intervened, called Buttes à Neveu, about six hundred paces off. The first division of troops had scarcely come up when, about six o'clock this ridge was suddenly thronged with white uniforms. It was the battalion of Guienne, arrived at the eleventh hour from its camp by the St. Charles.

"Some time after there was hot firing in the rear. It came from a detachment of Bougainville's command attacking a house where some of the light infantry were posted. The assailants were repulsed, and firing ceased. Light showers fell at intervals, besprinkling the troops as they patiently stood waiting the event.

"It was towards ten o'clock when, from the high ground on the right, Wolfe saw that the crisis was near. The French on the ridge had formed themselves into three bodies, regulars in the centre, regulars and Canadians on the right and left. Two field pieces that had been dragged up the heights at the Anse de Foulon, fired on them with grape shot, and the troops rising from the ground, prepared to receive them. In a few moments more they were in motion. They came on rapidly, uttering loud shouts and firing as soon as they were within range. Their ranks, ill ordered at the best, were further confused by a number of Canadians who had been mixed among the regulars, and who, after hastily firing, threw themselves on the ground to reload. The British advanced a few rods, then halted and stood still. When the French were within forty paces the word of command rang out and a crash of musketry answered all along the line. The volley was delivered with remarkable precision. In the battalions in the centre, which suffered least from the enemy's bullets, the simultaneous explosion was afterwards said by the French officers to have sounded like a cannon shot."

On page 291 of the same volume, when describing the movements of the French, Mr. Parkman writes:

"As they advanced, the country behind the town opened more and more upon their sight, till at length when opposite Vaudreuil's house, they saw across the St. Charles, some two miles away, the red ranks of the British soldiers on the heights beyond.

"This is serious business," Montcalm said, and he sent off Johnstone at full gallop to bring up the troops from the centre and left of the camp.

"The army followed in such order as it might, crossed the bridge in hot haste, passed the northern rampart of Quebec, entered the Palace Gate, and pressed on in headlong march along the quaint narrow streets of the war-like town; troops of Indians in scalplocks and war paint, a savage glitter in their deep set eyes, bands of Canadians whose all was at stake—faith, country and home; the colony regulars, the battalions of Old France, a torrent of white uniforms and gleaming bayonets, LaSarre, Languedoc, Roussillon, Béarn—victors of Oswego, William Henry and Ticonderoga. So they swept on, poured out upon the plains, some by the Gate of St. Louis and some by that of St. John, and hurried breathless to where the banners of Guienne still fluttered on the ridge.

"Montcalm was amazed at what he saw. He expected a detachment, and found an army."

According to Mr. Parkman, at the time the English line was formed, Quebec was not a mile distant. Therefore, the army was on the east side of the Toll Gate.

The writer seems to wish to be precise in his estimate of the distance of the army from the city, for he adds that the city could not be seen because a ridge, Butte à Neveu, intervened, about 600 paces off.

Six hundred paces from the ridge would place the front of the English army on the line occupied by Webb's reserve, on plan A. Mr. Parkman marks an advance from this position, however. "The British advanced a few rods, then halted, and stood still. When the French were within forty paces, the word of command rang out and a crash of musketry answered all along the line."


There is evidently a close agreement between the testimony of Mr. Parkman and the evidence furnished by plan A on this point.

"It was towards ten o'clock, when from the high ground on the right, Wolfe saw that the crisis was near. The French on the ridge had formed themselves into three bodies."


By this passage it is proved, that while the English were in the position claimed by Mr. Parkman, that is, a "few rods" less than 600 paces from Butte à Neveu, the French were still on this ridge. Unless the English receded from their position, of which there is no evidence, it is difficult to imagine how any engagement could have taken place either on the race course or on the Marchmont property. There is not a single passage in Parkman, at least, I have not found one, which would imply that the battle occurred further west than the spot already described.

The next book to consider is "Picture of Quebec," published by Mr. Hawkins in 1834, seventy-five years after the battle. "Picture of

TRANS. R. S. C., 1899, PLAN B.







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Quebec" is an exceedingly interesting work, and by a great many is accepted as an authority of the highest order. Some writers have asserted that Mr. Hawkins was greatly assisted in the preparation of his book by Mr. James Thompson, who was present on the field of battle on the 13th of September, 1759. Whether Mr. Thompson was present, or not, seems to be doubtful, for in a note on page 474 of "Picture of Quebec," Mr. Hawkins explains: "Mr. James Thompson was not, we understand, actually present with the troops engaged in the battle of the Plains, being detached on duty. He was, however, Wolfe's companion in arms at Louisbourg and at Montmorenci, and though not actually on the spot, was doing duty with the army which captured Quebec."

We have, however, the journal attributed to Mr. James Thompson, which gives a very clear account of the battle, and we shall therefore be able to compare it with certain passages in Mr. Hawkins' book.

Before proceeding to make extracts from "Picture of Quebec," it is advisable to quote Mr. Hawkins' own words as to the sources of his information. "Another scarce work which was obligingly lent to us, is 'The Natural and Civil History of the French Dominions in North and South America, with an historical detail of the acquisitions made by the British arms in those parts, illustrated by maps and plans.' This work contains an official plan of the city of Quebec, as it surrendered in 1759, giving the fortifications in the St. Charles river with military accuracy. We have taken an account of the field of battle, and the position of the armies, principally from a plan in this work on a considerable scale, made by an officer of distinction, present thereat. We have used also another plan of the whole operations on both sides of the river from the camp at Orleans to the landing at Wolfe's Cove, drawn by a captain of the navy. The examination of these and other documents has enabled us to make our descriptions both exact and authentic." The work which Mr. Hawkins refers to, is Jeffrey's, and the plans which he mentions are the plans contained in this book. Mr. Hawkins, therefore, took the positions of the army from the plan marked B in this paper, from which the positions on plan A were established.

The first extract given commences on page 343 of "Picture of Quebec." "The exultation of Wolfe on thus finding himself, with scarcely any loss, on the heights of Abraham, may easily be conceived. After more than two months of solicitude, the object of his long and anxious wishes was before him—his only remaining hope was that Montcalm would give him battle—of the result he entertained no doubt. The hour of triumph so long sought for, so eagerly

"expected, was at hand—he was determined that day to decide the supremacy of England or France, in America, before the walls of her most important fortress:

"Conspicit in planos hostem descendere campos,

"Oblatumque videt votis sibi mille petitum

"Tempus, in extremos quo mitteret omnia casus."

"The first care of General Wolfe was to capture a four-gun battery on the left of the British, which was accomplished by Colonel Howe—the next, to draw up his little army to the best advantage, as the regiments landed, in order to meet General Montcalm, who was observed to be on the march from Beauport. Montcalm could scarcely give credit to the first messenger who brought him the news of the successful landing of the English. Wolfe's extraordinary achievement had indeed baffled all his plans, and astonished to the utmost by this unexpected event, he yet prepared for the crisis with promptness and courage. He immediately adopted the resolution of meeting Wolfe in the field and of deciding the fate of Canada in a pitched battle. In his determination he is said to have acted against the opinion of the Governor-General, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who had come down from Montreal.

"About nine o'clock the enemy advanced in three columns, having crossed the bridge of boats on the St. Charles. Their force consisted of two thousand regular troops, five thousand disciplined militia, and five hundred savages. At ten, Montcalm's line of battle was formed, at least six deep, having their flanks covered by a thick wood on each side—along the bushes in front he had thrown about fifteen hundred Canadians and Indians, whose firing was as galling as it was incessant, until the battle became general. The official despatches of General Townshend give full details of this memorable conflict, and of the subsequent surrender of Quebec."

Mr. Hawkins then gives the letters of General Monckton, Gen. Townshend, Admiral Saunders, and the articles of capitulation. As we have quoted from the despatches of Townshend and Saunders, it is not necessary to repeat them here. It should be observed that Mr. Hawkins speaks of the four-gun battery "*on the left of the British.*"

Later on Mr. Hawkins seems to place this battery on the *right* of the English.

On page 354, Mr. Hawkins proceeds: "Any one who visits the celebrated Plains of Abraham, the scene of this glorious fight—equally rich in natural beauty and historic recollections—will admit that no site could be found better adapted for displaying the evolutions of

"military skill and discipline, or the exertion of physical force and  
"determined valour."<sup>10</sup> The battle-field presents almost a level surface  
"from the brink of the St. Lawrence to the St. Foy Road. The Grande  
"Allée, or road to Cape Rouge, running parallel to that of St. Foy,  
"passed through its centre. That road was commanded by a field re-  
"doubt, in all probability the four-gun battery on the English left, which  
"was captured by the light infantry, as mentioned in General Towns-  
"hend's letter. The remains are distinctly seen near to the present  
"race stand. There were also two other redoubts, one upon the rising  
"ground in the rear of Mr. Campbell's house—the death scene of Wolfe  
"—and another towards the St. Foy Road, which it was intended to  
"command. On the site of the country seat called Marchmont, the  
"property of the Honourable J. Stewart, and at present the residence  
"of Mr. Daly, Secretary of the Province, there was also a small redoubt,  
"commanding the entrenched path leading to the Cove. This was  
"taken possession of by the advanced guard of the light infantry, im-  
"mediately on ascending the heights. At the period of the battle the  
"plains were without fences or enclosures,<sup>11</sup> and extended to the walls to  
"the St. Lewis side. The surface was dotted over with bushes, and the  
"woods on either flank were more dense than at present, affording shel-  
"ter to the French and Indian marksmen. In order to understand  
"the relative position of the two armies, if a line be drawn to the St.  
"Lawrence from the General Hospital, it will give nearly the front of  
"the French army at ten o'clock, after Montcalm had deployed into  
"line. His right reached beyond the St. Foy Road, where he made  
"dispositions to turn the left of the English. Another parallel line,  
"somewhat in advance of Mr. C. G. Stewart's house on the St. Foy  
"Road, will give the front of the British army, before Wolfe charged at  
"the head of the Grenadiers of the 22nd, 40th and 45th regiments,  
"who had acquired the honourable title of Louisbourg Grenadiers, from  
"having been distinguished at the capture of that place, under his own  
"command, in 1758. To meet the attempt of Montcalm to turn the  
"British left, General Townshend formed the 15th regiment *en potence*,  
"or presenting a double front. The light infantry were in the rear of  
"the left, and the reserve was placed in rear of the right, formed in  
"eight subdivisions, a good distance apart. The English had been  
"about four hours in possession of the plains, and were completely pre-  
"pared to receive them, when the French advanced with great resolu-  
"tion. The English were ordered to reserve their fire until within  
"forty yards. They observed these orders most strictly, bearing with  
"patience the incessant fire of the Canadians and Indians. It is also  
"stated that Wolfe ordered the men to load with an additional bullet.

"which did great execution. The two Generals, animated with equal spirit, met each other at the head of their respective troops where the battle was most severe. Montcalm was on the left of the French, at the head of Languedoc, Béarn and Guienne—Wolfe on the right of the English at the head of the 28th and the Louisbourg Grenadiers. Here the greatest exertions were made under the eyes of the leaders—the action in the centre and left was comparatively a skirmish. The severest fighting took place between the right of the race stand and the Martello towers. The rapidity and effect of the English fire having thrown the French into confusion, orders were given even before the smoke cleared away, to charge with the bayonet. Wolfe exposing himself at the head of the battalions, was singled out by some Canadian marksmen, on the enemy's left, and had already received a slight wound in the wrist. Regardless of this, and unwilling to despirit his troops, he folded his handkerchief round his arm, and putting himself at the head of the Grenadiers, led them on to the charge, which was completely successful. It was bought, however, with the life of their heroic leader. He was struck with a second ball in the groin, but still pressed on, and just as the enemy were about to give way, he received a third ball in the breast, and fell mortally wounded. The spot consecrated by the fall of General Wolfe, in the charge made by the Grenadiers upon the left of the French line, will to the latest day be visited with deep interest and emotion. On the highest ground considerably in advance of the Martello Towers commanding a complete view of the field of battle—not far from the fence which divides the race ground from the enclosures on the east, and opposite the right of the English—are the remains of a redoubt against which the attack was directed which Wolfe so gallantly urged on by his personal example. A few years ago a rock was pointed out as marking the spot where he actually breathed his last, and in one of the enclosures near the road is the well whence they brought him water. It is mentioned in the statistical work of Colonel Bouchette, that one of the four meridian stones, placed in 1790 by Major Holland, then Surveyor-General of Canada, 'stood in the angle of a field redoubt where General Wolfe is said to have breathed his last.' As he had been conveyed a short distance to the rear after being struck with the fatal ball, it must be presumed that this redoubt had been captured, and that the Grenadiers were pressing on when he received his mortal wound. This is corroborated by a letter which we have met with, written after the battle by an officer of the 28th regiment serving at the time as a volunteer with the Louisbourg Grenadiers under Colonel Murray. He speaks of the redoubt as 'a rising ground,' and shows

"that Wolfe was in possession of it previously to his last wound. Upon the General viewing the position of the two armies, he took notice of a small rising ground between our right and the enemy's left, which concealed their motions from us in that quarter, upon which the General did me the honour to detach me with a few Grenadiers to take possession of that ground, and maintain it to the last extremity, which I did until the two armies were engaged, and then the General came to me, but that great, that ever memorable man, whose loss can never be enough regretted, was scarce a moment with me till he received his fatal wound."

Mr. Hawkins' account appears to be in accordance with the majority of the testimony, until he commences to picture the scene himself, then it becomes a case of Hawkins versus Hawkins. In the first place he describes the four-gun battery as being on the left of the British. Later, he claims that the ruins of the battery near the race stand which commanded the field, were probably the remains of the battery mentioned by Townshend in his despatch. If this were so, then the battery would have been on the right of the English and not on the left as asserted by Townshend, Knox, and other authorities. Moreover, on the plans, and on the drawing made at the time by the aide-de-camp of General Wolfe, this battery is placed on the left, the guns command the river and not the field, and between the battery and the field, some houses intervene.

In his attempt to be precise as to the relative positions of the army, Mr. Hawkins is unfortunate. The terminus *a quo*, without the terminus *ad quem*, is useless. The St. Lawrence is a large river, and a line might be drawn from either of the points given by Mr. Hawkins to Cape Diamond to Sillery, or to any other point on the river at will. We are, therefore, unable to gain much information from this source.

The next passage of importance in this quotation, is the direct statement that the severest fighting occurred between the right of the race stand and the Martello Towers. On page 357, Mr. Hawkins writes: "The English were ordered to reserve their fire until the French were within forty yards. They observed these orders strictly." The French were therefore within forty yards of the right of the race stand. Mr. Hawkins makes it quite clear that the redoubt near which Wolfe is said to have died, was occupied by the English before the final engagement. As this redoubt is at least a quarter of a mile eastward of the right of the race stand, the French to gain this ground within 40 yards of the English, must have passed the Grenadiers who occupied the redoubt, and cut them off from the rest of the English army. "The General did me the honour to detach me with a few Grenadiers to take that

"ground and maintain it to the last extremity, which I did until the *"two armies were engaged."* Further passages relating to this redoubt become still more involved. Mr. Hawkins refers to this redoubt as the place "against which the attack was directed, which Wolfe so gallantly urged on by his personal example." We have seen from the same author that the French were near the right of the race stand at the commencement of the attack, and that at the time the redoubt was occupied by the English, nevertheless, Mr. Hawkins states, that Wolfe gallantly led his men on to attack this redoubt. Wolfe was therefore, leading an attack against his own army. Mr. Hawkins seems to have had some doubt himself as to this position, for he adds "as he had been conveyed a short distance to the rear after being struck with the fatal ball, it *must be presumed* that this redoubt had been captured, and that the Grenadiers were pressing on when he received his fatal wound. "This is corroborated by a letter." The letter, however, makes it clear that it was not captured after the engagement, but that the English occupied it before without any action. "He took notice of a small rising ground between our right and the enemy's left, which concealed their motions from us in that quarter, upon which the General did me the honour to detach me with a few Grenadiers to take that ground and maintain it to the last extremity, which I did, until the two armies were engaged."

There is no mention of any action in connection with the taking of this ground. The General, before the battle, while reviewing the position of the armies, saw that it was an advantageous position, and sent a few men to occupy it. It has been shown by other testimony that Wolfe viewed the position of the armies from this rising ground before he formed his line, and it was after so doing that he disposed his troops in a circular form on its slope, and after this, again, according to Knox, that the armies moved a little nearer to each other.

It may be mentioned, that in 1841, seven years after the publication of his book, Mr. Hawkins published a plan of the battle inscribed to the Members of the United Service, and on this map, the four-gun battery does not appear. Two views of the army are given, one with the English line exactly at right angles with the gaol, and the other with the line exactly in the position placed by Jeffreys. These positions are probably correct. The first, no doubt, indicates the position of the English before the arrival of all the troops, as mentioned by Knox, and the second shows the final disposition of the troops made by Wolfe, immediately before the decisive action.

I think it is possible that Mr. Hawkins was not aware of the direction of the road leading from Wolfe's Cove, in 1759, at the time he wrote his book.

He speaks of this road as crossing the plains, and meeting the St. Louis Road at the entrance to the race course.

The road may have joined the St. Louis Road at this point some time after the battle, but in 1759 it wound round by the hill upon which the gaol now stands, and formed an angle with the St. Louis Road near de Salaberry Street. It is shown in this position on five different maps of the time, and the journal of Knox supports this position. "We are drawing artillery and ammunition ashore... and have found a convenient road for the purpose, leading directly from the Cove to the camp." The camp was situated, according to the same authority, at a distance of 1,000 yards from the garrison. Mr. Hawkins, believing that the road from the Cove joined the St. Louis Road at the entrance to the race course, and seeing that the line of the English army, on Jeffrey's plan, which he consulted, was placed at the point of union of the two roads, might have concluded, quite naturally, that the most severe part of the battle occurred here. We have shown, however, that the roads did not meet at the race stand in 1759.

On the map dedicated to the members of the army in 1841, Mr. Hawkins does not place this road from the Cove as meeting the St. Louis Road at the Race Stand, but at de Salaberry Street, in the same position as given on other maps.

Whether, therefore, in the interval between the publication of his book in 1834 and the issue of his plan in 1841, Mr. Hawkins had reason to alter his opinion, is not known, but the fact that his latest work agrees with the maps published by those who were present, is in itself significant.

Before considering the writings of other historians, we refer again to the rising ground or redoubt. Mr. Thompson thus speaks of it: "The General at first moved about everywhere, but after the beginning of the action he took up his position on a rising ground near to where our right flank was resting, from whence he had a view of the whole field. The enemy's line of battle was completed soon after ours." There is no mention here of any attack being directed against this redoubt, led by Wolfe. It is also implied that this was before the decisive firing, as the right flank was resting near here.

Mr. Hawkins apparently did not receive his information concerning the redoubt from Mr. Thompson.

The venerable historian, Sir James LeMoine, whose books have done so much to popularize the history of Quebec, now claims our attention.

In 1876, Sir James published a valuable book entitled "Quebec Past and Present," in which he devoted a chapter to the battle of the

Plans. I do not, however, find anything contrary to the position established by the plans, except in that portion where the author quotes from "Picture of Quebec," by Mr. Hawkins. As the pages referring to the battle have been quoted in this paper, it is unnecessary to repeat them. In 1882, Sir James published a sequel to the former book, under the title of "Picturesque Quebec," and in this volume many valuable notes are given concerning the location of the armies. A very good plan is also published, and from measurements taken, I find that the armies are placed in almost the same position as on plan A.

On page 309, Sir James writes: "Montcalm, conspicuous in front of the left wing of his line, and Wolfe at the head of the 28th regiment, and the Louisbourg Grenadiers, towards the right of the British line, must have been nearly opposite to each other at the commencement of the battle, which was the most severe in that part of the field, and by a singular coincidence each of these heroic leaders had been twice wounded during the brief conflict before he received his fatal wound." And on page 310, "In the September engagement, Montcalm's right wing rested on the St. Foye Road, his left on the St. Louis Road, near the Buttes à Neveu (Perrault's Hill)."

A foot note to one of the publications of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, edited by Sir James, gives the distance of the British line from the walls of the city. The quotation is from a book by Col. Beatson, published in 1854. "He (Montcalm) was at that moment between Les Buttes à Neveu and St. Louis Gate. From the city on the one side and the battle-field on the other, the ground rises until the two slopes meet and form a ridge, the summit of which was formerly occupied by a windmill belonging to a man named Neveu or Nepveu. About midway between this ridge and St. Louis Gate, and to the southward of St. Louis Road, are some slight eminences, still known to the older French residents as Les Buttes à Neveu or Neveu's hillocks, and about three-quarters of a mile distant from the spot where the British line charged." Three-quarters of a mile from a point midway between the ridge and St. Louis Gate would place the line of the British at Maple Avenue.

With the exception of these two quotations, I do not find anything in the writings of Sir James LeMoine, which disagrees with the positions of plan A. It is perhaps well to state that at the time many of the books were written from which we have quoted, the site of the battle had not become a question of dispute.

I have not found any passage either in the writings of the Abbé Casgrain or of the Abbé Ferland which tends to weaken the testimony of the authorities quoted in this paper. In Garneau, there is a para-

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graph which shows that the battle-field extended to the St. Foye Road, and that early in the day Wolfe had already entrenched himself in this direction. "Wolfe avait fait commencer le long du chemin Sainte Foye, une ligne de petites redoubtes en terre, qui se prolongeait en demi-cercle en arrière."

The movements of the British army after gaining the heights, as disclosed by the various sources mentioned in this paper, may be described in a few words. As soon as the troops had gained the summit, all was quiet, and a line was formed parallel with the river St. Lawrence, facing the north. The army then proceeded towards the St. Foye Road, along which it marched towards the town in files. Some houses were occupied near Maple Avenue, by the light infantry, and one of the houses was owned by Borgia. The army then wheeled to the right and formed the line of battle, the right of which extended to the edge of the cliff, near the river. Here the army rested for some time, and advanced posts were engaged in skirmishes with the Canadians, who were protected by a coppice. The houses on the left between the two armies were attacked, but the English maintained their position. A field piece was brought up by the British and placed in position. A new disposition of the army was made by Wolfe, and the reserve was stationed at the rear in about the centre of the line. The left of the line was strengthened by General Townshend on account of a movement on the part of the enemy to attack the flank in the rear, by way of Cote Ste. Geneviève. About this time a detachment of the Royal Americans was sent to the Marchmont property,<sup>12</sup> upon which the army first formed after gaining the heights, to preserve communication with the beach and with the boats. Before the general action had commenced, the troops had returned from the capture of the four-gun battery on the left of the landing, and took their position in the line. The enemy advanced until within about forty yards, and gave the first fire. The British returned the fire for about six or seven minutes, and then commenced to pursue the French towards the town, and down the cliff towards the River St. Charles. Some Canadians rallied near St. John's Gate, but after a few minutes firing they were dispersed.

Of the movements of the French army, General Malartic gives a very clear account. He shows that when the first alarm was given, two pickets were sent to Cote d'Abraham. Later, when Montcalm realized the position, he ordered a large number of troops to proceed to Wolfe's landing place, where he intended to follow. On the way these troops were met by the Major-General who informed them that Wolfe was already in battle opposite the city. He then directed them to proceed to the heights nearest the town. Montcalm arrived upon the

heights soon after, and decided to attack the enemy on the plain. After the line was formed at a short distance from the walls of the city, the army moved towards the ridge. A march was made towards the enemy in good order. When at about 100 paces from the ridge, the Canadians fired in an irregular manner, and then threw themselves flat upon the ground to reload. This unexpected movement disorganized the regular battalions, and most of the soldiers of the first line were killed. They met the British charge and then retreated.

The reserve of the British army does not appear to have taken any part in this engagement, unless they may have joined in the pursuit of the French. Mr. Parkman states that they took no part in the action.

Not a word is mentioned in the passages we have quoted that would lead one to suppose the French ever reached the ground known as the race course. On the contrary the whole evidence seems to indicate that until within a few moments before the decisive firing, the main body of the French army was upon the high ground, Claire Fontaine, and the only advance made from this position, was a distance of about 100 paces.

We have now to endeavour to ascertain, chiefly from the writings of those who were present, the time and the place of the death of Wolfe.<sup>13</sup>

By Townshend's account, the General fell at the head of Braggs, just as the enemy was giving way everywhere.

From Knox we learn that after Wolfe had been carried wounded to the rear of the front line, an officer exclaimed, "They run, see how they run. Who runs? demanded our hero, with great earnestness, "like a person roused from sleep. The officer answered, the enemy, "sir, egad, they give way everywhere."

Fraser simply states that the General was "killed in the beginning of the general action."

In the Gentleman's Magazine for December, 1759, this account of the death of Wolfe is given: "For our men so well levelled their pieces, "that there were few of the first and second ranks of the army (for they "were all regulars) that remained alive. In about seven minutes Lascelle's and Highlanders rushed upon them with bayonets fixed and "sword in hand....He went reeling aside, but was soon supported by "an officer of whom he inquired if the enemy were put to flight, and "being assured that they were and that our troops were in pursuit, he "smiled and said that he died with pleasure."

In the Annual Register for 1759, another account is given. "But "just as the fortune of the field began to declare itself, General Wolfe, "in whose life everything seemed included, fell....As he lay struggling "with anguish and weakness of three grievous wounds....he desired

"an officer who was by him, to give him an account of what he saw. The officer answered that the enemy seemed broken, he repeated his question a few minutes after with much anxiety, when he was told that the enemy was totally routed, and that they fled in all parts."

The Abbé Ferland gives this version: "Blessé au poignet au commencement de l'action, Wolfe s'était contenté de l'envelopper, et continuait à commander les troupes, dans un des endroits les plus périlleux, lorsqu'il reçut dans la poitrine une balle qui le renversa, il mourut peu après, ayant eu seulement le temps d'être informé que les Français prenaient la fuite."

It will be observed that from all these sources the French gave way immediately after the firing of the decisive volley. The question to determine here, is the time at which they gave way everywhere.

Colonel Fraser says that it was by the time the smoke from the powder had vanished, after firing six minutes. Captain Knox states: "Hereupon they gave way and fled with precipitation, so that by the time the cloud of smoke had vanished, our men were again loaded, and profiting by the advantage we had over them, pursued them almost to the gates of the town."

The Annual Register states that it was in seven minutes after the firing that the English commenced to pursue the enemy. During this interval, however, that is between the time of the firing, when Wolfe received his wound, and the time when the pursuit commenced, Wolfe was on the spot where he died. It was after he had been wounded; after he had been carried to the rear of the front line, and while lying upon the ground, that he was told that the enemy was giving way. It is, therefore, apparent that he must have fallen very near to the place where the firing occurred.

If the battle occurred on the Marchmont property, as some maintain, then the French must have receded in some unexplained manner a distance of over half a mile to a place east of Wolfe's monument, before giving way after the decisive volley, because it was from this spot that Wolfe was told that the enemy was beginning to give way. The accounts are very clear on this point. The enemy approached until within forty yards, and fired. The British returned their fire, and while they were reloading, before the smoke had cleared, the French were retreating, the British saw them in flight, and pursued them. Even if it were possible for the enemy to recede a distance of half a mile, whilst facing their opponents, it would have been impossible to have done so within the time indicated by the various authorities cited.

There is no difficulty to explain respecting the monument, if we accept the position established by the plan. The English received the

fire of the French at the place marked on the plan. Wolfe was at the head of Bragg's regiment, advancing the moment after the firing, but he fell instantly. "Our troops, says Townshend, reserved their fire till "within forty yards, which was so well continued that the enemy gave "way everywhere. It was then our General fell." The General apparently fell at a short distance in advance of the place where the decisive firing took place, and on the plan it will be seen that the monument is almost in a direct line in the rear of Bragg's regiment, from the front of which he was carried to the place where he died.

Reviewing the whole of the testimony, the principal points in favour of the position set forth, appear to be these :

1. The passages cited were probably recorded by their authors near the time of the battle, when the events were fresh to their minds.

2. The plan, upon which several of the calculations are based, has been proved by tests to be accurate in its general outlines, and to bear evidence of having been drawn by a competent officer. It bears the mark of being official by its inscription to the secretary of state, and the book with which it is published, is dedicated to Townshend.

3. The localization of houses on the left of the English line having been found to agree with the positions of houses indicated on the plan, and to accord with the evidence furnished by the journals of Fraser, Knox, Johnstone and Townshend.

4. The statement by Knox, that one of the houses, mentioned by name, was occupied by the English early in the morning, when they were practically in possession of the field, would seem to furnish proof that the French did not pass this point on the *left*.

5. The repeated statement by French and English authorities, that the British occupied an eminence on the right, the position of which is established, while the French were still on the ridge, affords grounds for the belief that the French did not pass this point on the *right*.

6. The distance between the houses occupied on the left, and the eminence on the right being about 1000 yards, renders it improbable that the French passed this line in the *centre*.

7. The statement by Knox, that the camp was situated at a distance of about 1000 yards from the garrison, and the evidence of Fraser, that the battle was fought on the ground where the camp was formed.

8. The repeated statements that immediately before the battle a detachment was sent to the ground on which the army formed after gaining the heights, to preserve communication with the landing place, which would apparently have been unnecessary if the English were drawn up in battle either on the race course or the Marchmont property,

as communication with the landing place would then have been insured by the presence of the whole of the army in its immediate vicinity.

9. The position of the English line near de Salaberry street, leaves the monument said to mark the spot where Wolfe died, at a reasonable distance in the rear of Bragg's regiment, at the head of which Wolfe is stated to have fallen.

10. The ground between de Salaberry street and Claire Fontaine appears to have been the most advantageous available, since it afforded houses on the left to shelter the troops, and an eminence on the right commanding a large portion of the ground chosen by the French.

Considering that all the points above referred to are supported in so many different ways by various sources, and that the written testimony agrees with the position of the ground which could not vary, the only conclusion I am able to form is, that the battle occurred between the lines indicated on plan A—between Claire Fontaine street and de Salaberry street. The principal action seems to have taken place on the right and left of the Grande Allée, and a great many were killed quite near St. John's Gate and on the embankment of Cote Ste. Geneviève, while several were killed near St. Louis Gate.

In connection with the site of the battle it may prove of interest to state that a part of the engagement was upon the ground actually owned by Abraham Martin, after whom the plains were named, and for this purpose copies of the earliest deeds relating to this property are published in the appendix to this paper.

Particulars relating to the property known as the race course are also given, from which it will be seen that the land was never owned by Abraham Martin, although his name was given to most of the property in the neighbourhood.

The two photographs specially taken for this paper show the ground upon which a portion of the English and French lines were drawn up, and it will be observed that a fair portion of land still remains vacant.

During the course of my investigations, I found that two important documents relating to the siege of Quebec were in Europe, and I have not yet received copies. I hope therefore, at some future date to prepare a supplementary paper. The whole of my study up to the present is placed at the disposal of those who are interested in the question, and I trust that at least some portion of it may be of assistance to students who desire to form an impartial judgment of the whole question, or to those who may wish to investigate the subject for themselves.

The list of authorities consulted and the plans examined in the preparation of this paper, are published for the purpose of facilitating further study.

To some it may be a cause of regret that the whole of the battlefield was not preserved. The names of the two heroes, Wolfe and Montcalm, are, however, imperishably enshrined in the pages of history, and their deeds have become their monument. Much of the ground once dyed by the blood of one-time friend and foe, is undoubtedly obscured from view, and will for ever remain unmarked, still in the words of the poet, George Murray,

"All earth becomes the monument of men who nobly die."

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NOTE.

Towards the close of my paper I mentioned that two important documents relating to the battle were in Europe, and that at the time of writing I had not received copies.

Since this paper has been in the press I have received the two plans referred to, and they confirm in every respect the accuracy of the positions established on Plan A.

The first is a copy of an exceedingly fine manuscript plan in colours, five feet by two feet, which was at one time in the possession of the Royal Engineers. This plan is the work of the Engineer-in-Ordinary and two Assistant Engineers of Wolfe's army. Minute details are given of every movement made by the army, and even the colours of the facings of the different corps are indicated. All the earth, works and redoubts, whether French or British, are distinguished, and, with the copious notes on the plan, it forms a complete history of the battle.

The late Mr. Faribault, in his valuable catalogue of works relating to North America, published in 1837, writes concerning this plan: "No description of Wolfe's campaign at Quebec could give so accurate an idea as is derived from this plan" and without it the best description would be very imperfect."

The plan is a complete refutation of the passages in Mr. Hawkins' book relating to the redoubt against which Wolfe led the attack, for it is stated on the plan that the redoubt was not erected until after the battle.

The battery on the right of the Race course, referred to by Mr. Hawkins, was also constructed after the battle.

According to this plan, the army was not at any time drawn up upon the ground forming the present Race course.

The other plan refers more particularly to the battle of 1700, and I hope at a future date to prepare a paper on this event.

## APPENDIX.

### LA CARRIERE DU GENIE.

Now Called the Race Course.

This property is bounded on the north by the Grande Allée, on the south by the River St. Lawrence, on the east by a line near the toll gate, and on the west by the Marchmont property.

For some reason, probably on account of the passages in "Picture of Quebec," referred to in the foregoing paper, and which have been repeated by other authors, this ground has been considered as the site of the battle of September 13th, 1759.

Indignation was expressed, both at home and abroad, when it was known that this land was about to be divided into building lots, although no attention seems to have been directed to the land on the opposite side of the road, or to the fact that houses are at present being built thereon. If a battle had occurred in this part of the town, it seems clear that it must have extended to the other side of the road, the scene also of the battle during the following year. No explanation, so far as I have seen, has been offered as to why this part of the ground should be considered more sacred than any other portion of the field, even presuming for the moment that an engagement was proved to have taken place here. No one claims it as the scene of the death of Wolfe, or of Montcalm, and the place of the death of the former is already marked. The place where Wolfe was wounded, and where he fell, is clearly shown even by Mr. Hawkins, to have been eastward of the monument, and this ground is already covered by the buildings of the gaol. It has been proved by eye-witnesses that many brave Canadians were killed on the borders of Cote Ste. Geneviève. Why should not this ground be preserved? It has also been shown by eye-witnesses that many were killed under the walls of the city. Why should not this place be marked? There is not one writer of the period who states that any loss occurred on the race course ground, and yet there is a desire to preserve it as the battle ground. I do not think that any one, after studying the ground, and the nature of its surroundings, would believe for a moment that a general, when practically in possession of the whole of the high ground,

would have confined his army within the small area of the race course. By doing so he would have been entirely at the mercy of his foes, for the declivity on Cote Ste. Geneviève, would have permitted any number of troops to ascend, unperceived, and attack him in the rear. Even the despatch of Townshend, which does not give many minute details, mentions that extra precautions were taken on this side, and that the army was subsequently strengthened, to prevent any attack in this direction. If this spot is not the site of the decisive contest, and not the place of the death of either of the leaders, it is difficult to understand why it is any more sacred than other portions of the ground between Marchmont and the city. In 1824, the property simply divided by a fence from the race course, was offered for sale, and so far as I have been able to ascertain, no objection was raised, although the third brigade of the Royal Americans was stationed on the Marchmont property.

The advertisement speaks of it being situated "Upon the Plains of Abraham."... "To persons inclined to purchase this estate upon speculation, it offers obvious advantages, as several valuable portions of "it might be laid off in small lots of from one to three acres."

Strong feeling, however, was exhibited by some of the inhabitants when the ground upon which the battle was actually fought, was about to be parcelled off in 1790. One indignant writer when referring to the farming out of "All Abraham's plains for a term of 40 years, at ten "shillings per annum for every superficial acre, in different parcels to "be picketed or fenced in by the leasees," is scarcely able to restrain his wrath, because it was "on this spot that the bleeding patriot who "sacrificed his life for his country, expired." The writer adds, "nor "have the nuns of the General Hospital or the Hotel Dieu, the proprietors, ever been abridged in the enjoyment of the emoluments "accruing from the heads of cattle fed there." The quotations which we have given seem to indicate that neither in 1790 or in 1824, the ground of the race course, or the Marchmont property, from which it is divided by a fence, was regarded as the field of battle. The nuns of the General Hospital, or of the Hotel Dieu, were never the owners of the race course property, as may be seen by the particulars hereafter given.

It would appear quite probable that the first author to place the field in this direction, was Mr. Hawkins, who admits that he based his positions on Jeffrey's plan. His statements have been repeated over and over again until the spot is pointed out to-day as the scene of the conflict. The ground has gradually been built upon westward, and as this is the only large piece of vacant ground near the monument, it is



quite natural that it should be pointed out to tourists as the battle field.

The total area of the race course property is about 87 arpents, and the title deeds show that it was divided into five concessions. The earliest paper referring to the ground, is a deed of concession to Denis Duquet, of thirty arpents of land, on the 15th of Sept., 1645, and ratified by the company of New France, on the 29th March, 1649. A copy of this deed is published herewith. The land was situated towards the west of the present inclosure, and was sold to the Ursulines on the 12th of March, 1671.

The second concession consisted of 25 arpents to Antoine Brassard on the 14th of February, 1647, and was bought by the Ursulines from the heirs Brassard, on the 28th of April, 1675. The third concession of land was made to Pierre Normand and Gervais Normand on the 14th of November, 1647, and acquired by the Ursulines on the 20th November, 1678. The fourth concession was made to Guillaume Gauthier on the 8th of May, 1651, and purchased by the Ursulines in 1690. The property was afterwards increased to the extent of one arpent on the eastern boundary, which was acquired from the Hotel Dieu. A piece of land in another part of the city being the price of the exchange.

Concession de trente arpens de terre situé près Québec, à Denis Duquet, le 15 septembre 1645, ratifiée par la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France le 29 mars 1649.

La Compagnie de la Nouvelle France. A Tous et à venir Salut.

Veu Lacte de département & distribution faite par Monsieur de Montmagny, Gouverneur et Lieutenant général pour le Roy à Kebecq et dans lestendue du fleuve St-Laurens en la Nouvelle France, suivant le pouvoir à luy donné par nostre Compagnie, et sous le bon plaisir d'Icelle, de Trente arpans de Terres scitués en la Nouvelle France le long du fleuve Saint Laurens, proche Kébecq, au profit de Denis Duquet, Habitant de la Nouvelle France. A la charge d'en prendre par luy Concession de nostre d. Compagnie, led. acte en datte du quinziesme jour de Septembre mil six cent quarante cinq, cy attaché par contressel, Nous avons donné concédé et octroyé et en vertu du pouvoir accordé à nostre Compagnie par Le Roy Nostre Souverain Siegneur, donnons, concédons et octroyons and. Denis Duquet Lesd. Trente arpans de terres ou environ ainsy qu'ils sont désignés par led. acte, Pour en jouir par led. Duquet, ses successeurs ou ayans cause à Tousiours aux Conditions portées par Iceully, et outre à la Charge du Cens qui sera de six deniers

pour arpant par chacun an. Led. Cens portant lots et ventes saisinne et amande et ce au cas et ainsy qu'il y échet en la Coutume de la prevosté et Vicomté de Paris. Mandons au Sieur Dailleboust, Gouverneur et Lieutenant général pour le Roy dans l'estendue du fleuve St-Laurens, Qu'il mette en bonne et deube possession led. Duquet desd. Trente arpans de terres cy dessus, luy assignant les bornes, et que de la prise de possession il fasse Procès Verbal pour estre envoyé en France au premier retour des vaisseaux Le Tout à la charge que lesd. terres n'ayent point encor esté concédées. Ce fut fait, donné, concédé et octroyé en L'assemblée des Intendant et Directeurs de la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France, en leur Bureau à Paris, L'an de grâce mil six cent quarante neuf, le vingt-neuvième jour de mars. En foy de quoy nous avons fait expédier les présentes sur la minutte signée de nous demeurée en nostre Bureau, et à Icelles fait apposer le sceau de nostre Compagnie.

Par la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France.

(signé) LAMY, (avec paraphe)

(L. S.)

4e décembre 1635, Procès verbal de bornage et arpentage de douze arpens de terre à Abraham Martin, par Jean Bourdon, arpenteur.

Je soubs signé, François Derré Sieur de Gan,<sup>14</sup> Commis Général et l'un des officiés de la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France que en vertu du pouvoir à moy donné par Mr de Champlain, Lieutenant général pour Le Roy, et de Monseigneur Le Cardinal Duc de Richelieu à Québec et en toute l'estendue du fleuve St-Laurens en lad. Nouvelle France, et terres circonvoisines comme aussy faisant pour Messieurs les associés au peuplement et défrichement des terres de lad. Nouvelle France et tout ce qu'il jugera estre nécessaire suivant dle pouvoir et commission de Messieurs Les Intendant et Directeurs de lad. Compagnie et d'autant que led. Sieur de Champlain seroit atteint d'une griesve maladie pour ne pouvoir agir en vertu dud. pouvoir, Jay pris avec moy Mr Olivier Le Tardif<sup>15</sup> Commis general au Magasin pour Messieurs de La Compagnie particullière et le Sieur Bourdon Ingénieur et Arpenteur, me serois transporté ce quatriesme jour de décembre Mil Six Centz Trente Cinq<sup>16</sup> aux terres données à Abraham Martin<sup>17</sup> au nombre de douze arpens Lesquels Jay fait mesurer, arpenter et borner par led. Sieur Bourdon pour y mettre led. Martin en pleine possession pour en jouir luy et ses hoirs et ayans cause à l'advenir, à la charge qu'il prendra ratification du don desd.—Messieurs les Intendant et Directeurs, Lesquels se sont Réservé de donner les titres honneurs et Redevances et d'autant qu'il est néces-

saire d'avoir Une Mesure dans led. pays pour arpenter, en a jugé à propos de prendre celle de Paris qui font dix-huit pieds pour perche et cent perches pour arpent à ce qu'à l'advenir toutes Choses soient Régliées esgallement, les bornes des terres dud. Martin sont d'un costé le long d'un Costeau proche du chemin des Recollets, d'autre costé les terres non désertes, d'un bout Guillaume Hubou<sup>18</sup> et d'autre bout lesd. terres non désertes tirant vers Recolletz, les lignes courantes à Lest quart de nord est de ouest quart de sorrouest, et d'autre ligne au sud quart de sud est et nord quart de norrouest jusques à la fourniture desd. douze arpens.

Faict les an et jour que dessus.

(signé)

DERRE, (avec paraphe)

LETARDIE, (avec paraphe)

JEHAN BOURDON,<sup>19</sup> De la  
ville (avec paraphe) Gref-  
fier Commis à la Juridic-  
tion de Québec.

16 May 1650 : Ratification d'une concession faite à Abraham Martin par feu Mr Gand (François Derré, sieur de Gand) en 1635—Douze arpens de terre—Cheffault.

La Compagnie de la Nouvelle France à Tous ceux qui ces présentes Lettres verront, Salut.

Désirant de tout son pouvoir obliger les habitants à travailler au défrichement des terres du Pays, et à se bastir, elle auroit ey devant donné pouvoir au feu Sieur de Champlain, Lieutenant général pour le Roy, dans toute l'estendue du Fleuve de St-Laurens, de distribuer des Terres aux Habitans, à la charge de faire ratifier les Concessions qu'il en auroit faites, Lequel sieur de Champlain estant detenu de maladie au licit; affin que la dite distribution des terres ne demeurast, auroit donné pouvoir au Sr François Derré, Commis général de la Compagnie de distribuer à Abraham Martin, Habitant demeurant au dit Pays, douze arpens de Terre situez dans la banlieue de Québecq; Lequel Sr Derré auroit iceluy Abraham Martin mis en pleine possession desd. Douze Arpens de terre, auxquelles il a fait planter des Bornes, après la mesure d'iceux faite par Jean Bourdon, Me Arpenteur, le quatriesme décembre Mil six Cens Trente Cinq. Lequel Abraham Martin requéreroit humblement la Compagnie de vouloir ratifier la dite Concession, et la charger de telle redevance qu'elle adviseroit. A Ces Causes. Inclins à la Requeste dudit Martin, nostre ditte Compagnie a ratifié et agréé lad.

Concession faite audit Martin, A la charge de Douze deniers de Cens pour chacun arpent par an, qui seront payez entre les mains des Officiers qui seront commis par la Compagnie, Ledit Cens portant Lots, Ventas, Saisines, et Amandes quand le cas eschet, selon la Coustume de Paris. En foy de quoy Nous avons fait signer les présentes par le Secrétaire de nostre Compagnie le Seiziesme May Mil Six Cens Cinquante, en l'Assemblée de ladite Compagnie.

Par la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France.

(signé) A. CHEFFAULT (avec paraphe)

5 avril 1639.—Concession par la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France à Adrien Duchesne. Ratification de la concession faite par C. H. de Montmagny le 9 juillet 1636.

La Compagnie de la Nouvelle France à Tous ceux qui les présentes veront, salut: Scavoir faisons que veu l'acte de distribution et département des terres en la Nouvelle France dont la teneur en suict, Nous, Charles Huault de Montmagny, Lieutenant pour Sa Majesté en toute l'estendue du fleuve St-Laurens, en la Nouvelle France, en vertu du pouvoir à Nous donné par Messieurs de la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France, avons distribué et départy, soubz le bon plaisir de Messieurs de lad. Compagnie au Sieur Adrien DuChesne, la Consistance de vingt arpens de bois, ou environ, mesure de Paris, en Rotture, scituez dans la banlieuë de Québec et compris dans les bornes et limittes qui en suivent, scavoir: du costé du sudest quart au sud Abraham Martin, du costé du nordouest le coteau de Ste. Geneviève, du costé du sud ouest quart au ouest Mr Darpentigny, et du costé du nordouest quart à l'est le Sr Hubou, ainsy qu'il est descript et exprimé en la Charte qui est demeurée au Greffe signé de Nous, pour jouir, luy, ses Héritiers et ayans cause, plainement et paisiblement, en pure rotture, aux charges et censives que Messieurs de la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France ordonneront, et ce à la charge que led. Sieur Adrien Duchesne fera travailler au défrichement des dicts bois et souffrira que les chemins qui se pourront establir par les officiers de Messieurs de lad. Compagnie passent par ses terres sy ainsy les dicts officiers le jugent expédiant. Et prendront Concession de Messieurs de lad. Compagnie, des dicts bois à luy par nous distribuez le Neufiesme Jour de Juillet mil six cent trente sept, signé C. H. de Montmagny. La Compagnie a confirmé et confirme lad. distribution de terres, et, en tant que besoing est, en a de nouveau fait don et concession aud Sr Adrien du Chesne. Pour en jouir, par luy, ses successeurs ou ayans cause, aux dictes charges et conditions ci dessus exprimées et outre

moyennant. Un Denier de Cens pour chaque arpent de terres par chacun an, dont pourtant ils ne paieront aucune chose durant les dix premières années à compter du jour de lad. distribution. En Tesmoing de Quoy les directeurs de lad. Compagnie on fait expédier les présentes qui furent faictes et concédés en l'assemblée tenue en l'hostel de Monsieur Fouquet, Conseiller du Roy en ses Conseils d'Estat et privé: A Paris, le Cinquiesme Avril mil six cens trente neuf, et à Icelles fait apposer le sceau de la dicte Compagnie.

Par la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France.

(signé) LAMY (avec paraphe)

## NOTES.

<sup>1</sup> "Moreover, I was assured by your deserters you had no troops on the Heights of Abraham."—Johnstone, page 33.

<sup>2</sup> The River St. Charles is not visible from the Marchmont property. General Wolfe was probably upon the St. Foye road at the time.

<sup>3</sup> Since this paper was submitted to the Honorary Secretary of the Royal Society, I have received several plans from Europe which show that the battery referred to by Mr. Hawkins was erected after the 13th of September.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Noble, in his "Journal of the Siege," says that this battery was captured without the loss of a man, and that the powder was destroyed.

<sup>5</sup> It is shown on the large manuscript plans which I have received since this paper has been in the press, that the condition of the ground now forming the racecourse would have prevented operations there on the day of the battle.

<sup>6</sup> This is a very good estimate of the distance, and it is important in view of the other estimates made by Fraser.

<sup>7</sup> On a manuscript plan obtained from England this small eminence is shown to be in this position.

<sup>8</sup> "This bakehouse appears to have been somewhere at the foot of Abraham's Hill."—Sir James LeMoine, "Picturesque Quebec," p. 433.

<sup>9</sup> It would have been impossible for any action on the south side of the Grande Allée to have been seen from the walls of the city, if it had occurred west of de Salaberry street, on account of the height of the hill, and also on account of the distance (nearly one mile).

<sup>10</sup> At the time of the battle the racecourse was not a clear piece of ground as it is to-day.

<sup>11</sup> A part of the ground was inclosed.

<sup>12</sup> According to the three manuscript plans I have lately received, the 3rd battalion of Royal Americans was placed near the site of the Marchmont buildings.

<sup>13</sup> For many interesting particulars relating to the death of Wolfe, the reader's attention is directed to an excellent article in "Canadiana," vol. i, by Mr. George Murray, F.R.S.C.

<sup>14</sup> François Derré, Sieur de Gand, was buried beside Champlain as a mark of honour.

<sup>15</sup> Le Tardiff was one of the first inhabitants of Côte Beaupré.

<sup>16</sup> Twenty-one days before the death of Champlain, which occurred on Christmas day the same year (1635).

<sup>17</sup> Abraham Martin, styled l'Ecossais, was of Scotch descent. He was a king's pilot. He left only one son, who became a priest. His daughters are the ancestresses of most of the French Canadian families.

<sup>18</sup> Guillaume Hubou was one of the first settlers. His house occupied the present site of Mr. Darlington's establishment, corner of Buade and Du Fort streets. The said Hubou was collector of revenues of the parish church of Quebec.

<sup>19</sup> Jean Bourdon's name is perpetuated in that of St. John street.

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
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 Copy of large Ms. Plan made by three officers of Wolfe's army.  
 Engraving of the Scene of Battle made from a drawing by the aide-de-camp of General Wolfe.  
 Many of the scarce works and plans consulted during my investigations were kindly placed at my disposal by Mr. Phileas Gagnon, of Quebec, to whom also I am indebted for many valuable suggestions which facilitated my labours.

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PART OF THE GROUND UPON WHICH THE BRITISH ARMY WAS DRAWN UP.





PART OF THE GROUND UPON WHICH THE FRENCH ARMY WAS DRAWN UP.